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INTRODUCTION
An analysis of the relationships between public
policy and public opinion is vital to gaining an under
standing and appreciation of the political process in
the United States.

According to democratic theory,

citizens are to be free to express their views on
issues and policy decisions�

In a representative

democracy the elected officials are supposed to carry
out the wishes of their constituents.

This study is

directed toward analyzing the relationships between
foreign aid policy and public opinion toward ten
selected policy changes which have taken place since
World War II.

It focuses on the formal foreign aid

program; and, therefore, secondary aid such as .contri

butions to international organizations and isolated
programs such as the Social Progress Trust Fund do not
fall within the scope of the work.

The purpose of the

thesis is to prove or disprove the hypothesis by
revealing the impact of selected changes in foreign aid
policy of the United States on public opinion.

This

is accomplished by determining the relationships
between policy changes and public opinion since World
war II.

Ten specific policy changes serve as the basis

for examining public opinion as measured in national
l

2
surveys and in an original pilot study carried out in

Kalamazoo, Michigan.

The hypothesis is composed of three proposi
tions.

First, it is assumed that, because the amount

of attention given to foreign aid is very small, peo
ple in general are not aware of policy changes.

Second, since the average citizen has little interest
in foreign aid policy and the impact of foreign aid is
remote from the general public, it is further assumed
that most Americans do not understand the substance
and significance of policy changes.

Third, because of

a lack of time, interest, and comprehension, the gen
eral public is assumed to be inadequately prepared to
fairly evaluate the policy changes documented in this
thesis.

Evidence has been gathered in order to test

the validity of the assumptions in this hypothesis.

It will be supported or disproved through an analysis

of national surveys and a local pilot study as they
relate to the documented policy changes.

Validation

of the hypothesis is sought through an analysis and
evaluation of data as it relates to the following spe
cific questions:
(1)

To what degree are people in general aware

of the ten selected changes in foreign aid policy?
(2)

What are the preferences of the American

p_
public in respect to those aspects of foreign aid pol
i�y which have undergone changes?
(3)

What explanations for particular views and/

or lack of knowledge do the public opinion surveys
provide?

(4)

Does public dissatisfaction with foreign

aid policy have any causal relationship to specific
policy changes?
This study is composed of five sections.

In

Chapter One, the principles, assumptions, and objec
tives underlying foreign aid since its inception dur

ing World War II are examined.

A resume_of its histor

ical development serves as a background for policy
changes.

To put public opinion on foreign aid in

proper perspective, the primary arguments, pro and cqn,
which have persisted over the last twenty years are
analyzed.

Chapter Two gives a documented account of

ten selected changes in foreign aid policy.

An exam

ination and analysis of the results of national opin
ion surveys are presented in Chapter Three.

The

specific survey questions cited are considered in their
relationship to changes in policy.

Chapter Four deals

with the original research which was carried out for
this thesis.

The results of a pilot study of opinion

leaders and influentials in Kalamazoo, Michigan, are

presented and analyzed in relation to the changes
also.

Final conclusions aimed at proving or disprov

ing the hypothesis are developed in Chapter Five.

CHAPI'ER I
FOREIGN AID:
1.

A CONTINUING DEBATE

Principl es and Objectives

The basic principles underl ying foreign aid po l 
icy since its beginning in 1942 have been that assist
ing other countries is vita l to the nationa l security
of the United States and that using the weal th of
resources to he l p foreign countries is of great val ue
in itse l !, a responsibility of a Great Power.

The

first principl e is derived from the idea that the
strength and security of the Free Wor ld direct l y affect
the national security of the United States.

The second

principle is based on the moral obligation of helping
those in need.

The first principl e is expressed in the

official description of the purpose of foreign aid,
"to foster a worl d environment that is conducive, not
onl y to our survival but to the continuation of our
free society ,. " l

President John F .. Kennedy reaffirmed

the moral val ue of giving foreign assistance in his
1Q,&. Foreign Aid: Its Purposes, Scope, Admin
i;tration, and Related Information. Prepared by the
Legislative Reference Service, U.S. Library of Congress
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
June 11, 1959), P• 4.
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inaugural address:
••• To those people in the huts and villages
of half the globe struggling to break the
bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best
efforts to help them help themselves, for
whatever period is required--not because the
Communists may be doing it, not bec�use we
seek their votes, but because it is right.2
In his message to Congress on foreign aid in mid-Jan
uary of 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson expressed

both of these concepts:

For our own security and well-being, and as
responsible free men, we must seek to share
our capacity for growth, and the promise of
a better life, with our fellow men around
the world. That is what foreign aid is all
· about.,
The Agency for International Development, cre
ated in 1961 to administer foreign aid, has officially
endorsed the position that the stronger countries will
have to continue to assist the countries that are mil
itarily and economically most vulnerable to aggression
or subversion.

This view rests on the, basic concept

accepted by successive administrations that the coun
tries of the Free World constitute a community of
nations with common objectives.
�

The attainment of

2John F. Kennedy as quoted in To Turn the Tide,
edited by John w. Gardner (New York: 7Iarper-�ros."";
1962), pp. 7-8.

'u.s. Con�ressional Record, Proceedings and
Debates e>rthe 8th
Congress, First Session, Vol. III,
No. 9 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1965) p. 650.

?
security and progress in freedom is vital to each of

them individually, with the United States committed to
an active role in this pursuit.· Attaining the objec
tivei of self-defense, the maintenance of sovereignty,
and economic development rests on two primary assump
tions.

First, the principles underlying foreign aid

are based on the assumption that assistance can in
fact help countries to realize these objectives.
retary of State Dean Rusk has stated:

Sec

"Economic and

military assistance, used at the right time and in the

right way, can provide indispensable help••• 11 4 in
achieving foreign aid objectives.

Aid during the·

immediate postwar period was based on the assumption
that it would be needed for only a short period of

time.5 This idea has since given way to the realiza
tion that foreign aid may be necessary for an indef
inite period of time.

The policy reversal stems from

the change in objectives from providing relief and
rehabilitation to giving assistance aimed at bringing
4Message From the President of the United
States TransmittingRecommendationsReI'ative to For
�ign Assistance to the House of Representatives,7mth
Congress, 2nd Session, Document No. 250, March 19,
1964 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office» 1964), p. 2.

5H. J. P. Arnold, Aid f.2£ Developin5 9ountries
(Chester Springs, Pennsylvania: Dufour Editions, l962),

P• 29.
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about economic viability in under-developed countries.
Currently, the Agency for International Deveiopment

(AID) assumes that the objectives will be achieved to

the extent that under-developed countries supplement
this aid with significant efforts to help themselves:.

Aid is most effective in bringing about the
transition from dependence or stagnation to
self-sustaining growth if it is concentrated
on the countries that are doing the most to
help themselves.6
.
Consequently, the degree of self-help is one of the
criteria used in selecting those countries which are
to receive the largest amounts of foreign aid.
The ultimate goals of foreign aid have been
expressed in several different ways.

Nevertheless,

the goals essentially are to help other countries
maintain their independence and to help them achieve
economic development to the point at which they reach
self-sustained growth in freedom.

In more idealistic

terms, President Kennedy expressed the basic objective
of foreign aid in a speech to Congress in 1962.
Its fundamental task is to help make an his
torical demonstration that in the twentieth
century as in the nineteenth� in the southern
half of the globe as in the north, economic
�rowth and political democracy can develop
6Principles of Foreign Economic Assistance,
U.S. Department of state, Agency for International
Development, Program Coordination Staff (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963),
pp. 3-4.

9

hand in hand.?
Clearly, the goals of foreign aid are both economic
and political.
The abstract nature of principles, assumptions,
and objectives is understandably difficult for the
general public to grasp.

People are more likely to

comprehend concrete examples and definite programs.
In order to put the preceding points in context, an
historical account of United States foreign aid fol
lows with the intention that it make the principles,
assumptions, and objectives easier to understand and
give them greater significance.
2.

Historical Background

The beginning of today's economic aid program
dates from the creation in March, 1942, of the Insti
tute of Inter-American Affairs, responsible for pro
viding technical assistance to the Latin American
countries.8 After World War II, foreign aid was
aimed at providing relief and rehabilitation assist7John F. Kennedy, as quoted in 12, Turn the
p. 146.
8The AID Pro ram, U.S. Department of State,
�
Agency f�International Development (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1964),
p. 3.

10
ance to war-ravaged areas of Europe and the Far East.
The major organization was the United Nations Relief
and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) which
received 72 per cent of its financial support from the
United States.

Between July 1, 1945, and June 30,

1948, the United States provided more than $14 billion

in grants (including UNRRA) and $7.7 billion in loans.9
In 1947, when containment of Communist global
ambitions became a keystone of U.S. foreign policy,
foreign aid was given a new task, that of directing
$400 million in military and economic aid to Communist
threatened Greece and Turkey.10 Thus, the first phase
of postwar aid was linked to the Cold War.

As one

writer indicated, "The importance lies in the fact

.that this inaugurated the postwar U.S. foreign aid pro
gram as a means of opposing indirect Soviet aggression
through the use of American money and material.11
Fear of Soviet aggression led to the establishing of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, and a
subsequent military assistance program for Western

g9f

9Norman Jacobs, (ed.), Great Decisions
(New York: The Foreign Policy Association, 19 4 ,
p. 72.
10H. J. P. Arnold, Aid for Developing Countries, p. 30.
11 u.s. Foreign
·
A'd, p. 31 •
2,_

Europe.12

11
Additional aid was granted to individual

countries, especially in Asia and the Pacific.

This

aid was primarily military also and was given to

achieve limited objectives.

Thus, the Cold War

brought about a basic change in the nature of Amer

ican aid.

In 1948, the second phase of Cold War aid was

initiated by the creation of the European Recovery
Program.

The allocation of Marshall Plan aid was

based on a regional plan prepared by the recipient
countries themselves.

Another aspect of the Marshall

Plan which was also absent from preceding programs

was the objective of not simply providing relief, but

assisting economic rehabilitation combined with self
help.13 A corollary of American policy was European
economic integration.

In 1951, a new program was

inaugurated to help Europe rearm.

Thus, the Economic

Cooperation Administration which administered the Mar

shall Plan was replaced by the Mutual Security
Agency.14 In total, sixteen nations received $21 bil
lion in the period from 1948 to 1952.15 The Marshall
12Norman Jacobs, Great Decisions 1964, p. ?.
13u.s. Foreign Aid,
P•. 32.
14Ibid.,
P• 43.
15Jack c. Plano and Milton Greenberg, The Amer-

12
Plan was successful in helping to rebuild the war
shattered economies of Western Europe and thus was a
significant factor in weakening the influence of both
the Soviet Union and the Communist ideology in West
ern Europe. 16
Two additional programs came into existence
during this period.

President Harry S. Truman in his

inaugural address in January, 1949, proposed a bold
new approach aimed at assisting in the economic devel
opment of under-developed areas of the world.

The

"Point IV" program of technical assistance subsequently

was launched in 1950, when Congress passed the Act for
International Development.17 This program served to
supplement the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949,
the major purpose of which was to help Europe rearm
speedily without sacrificing its economy and the aid
given under the Marshall Plan.18 The Act for Inter

national Development was replaced in 1951, however, by
the Mutual Security Act which provided money for mil
itary, economic, and technical assistance--more eviican, Political Dictionary, (New York: Holt, Rinehart
andWinston, 1962), p. 313.
16u.s. Foreign Aid, p. 44.
17� AID Program, p. 4.
18 u.s. Foreign Aid, p. 31.

13
dence that U.S. aid was increasingly defense ori
ented.19 This phase continued for over five years.

When President Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed office in

1953, the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) was

established as successor to the Mutual Security Agency
of 1950.20 Another development in foreign aid policy
was instituted in 1954 byPublic Law 480.

Known as

the Food for Peace program, it provided for the sale

of surplus agricultural products to under-developed

countries.

These countries pay for the goods in local

curriencies which then form a pool from which devel

opmental loans can be made by the United States to the
recipient countries.21
The third phase of postwar aid was marked by a

new emphasis placed on providing capital as well as

technical assistance for economic development.

Since

19H. J.P. Arnold, Aid for Developing Coun
tries, p. 31.
20Report to the Con ress on the Foreign Assist
�Program forthe Fisca� Year--r961. Prepared under
the directionof the Administrator o the Agency for
International Development with the cooperation and
participation of the Department of State and the
Department of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.Se Govern
mentPrinting Office, 1963), p. 3.
21Food.for Peace ••• Building a Better World,
Food for Peace7rrfice, The White House. U.S. Depart
ment of State, Information Staff of the Agency for
International Development (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
GovernmentPrinting Office, 1963), p. 5.
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the immediate military needs of Europe and the less
.

'

developed countries had eased somewhat by the mid1950's, the International Cooperation Administration
was created in 1956 to replace the FOA.

In 1957, pol

icy was further revised with the establishment of the
Development Loan Fund.

Previously, aid had been

extended largely in the form of grants; the new pro
gram permitted the offering of long-term, low-interest
loans to countries engaged in carrying out economic
development programs.22
By 1961--the beginning of the fourth phase--the
conditions which governed the foreign aid program dur
ing the 1950's had changed considerably.

Europe had

completely recovered from the war and the need for
large-scale military assistance had been reduced.
However, while the threat of overt Communis.t aggres
sion had declined, the danger of internal subversion
had increased.

Therefore, a new approach to the prob

lem of Communist expansionism was required.

The suc

cess of the independence movement in Asia and Africa
necessitated further policy refinements with respect
to economic development assistance.

To meet these

needs, the Agency for International Development (AID)
22Report to the Con ress on the Foreign Assist
� Program forthe Fisca� Year--r962, p. 3.

15
was established in 1961 to implement new working con
cepts through a centralized organization.

Five prem

ises, indicating major shifts in emphasis, were set
forth:
(1) long-term development assistance based on
plans prepared by the developing countries;
(2) self-help;
(3) adapting of aid to countries, consistent
with their ability to use it effectively;
(4) loans in preference to grants;
(5) a greater share of the responsib�lity of
foreign aid borne by our allies. '

Although nearly one-half of the American pop

ulation is old enough to have read or at least heard

about each phase of foreign aid policy, relatively few
people have been aware of the different programs and
· 24 One crucial indica. purpose and emphasis.
sh·ft
1 s in
tor of a lack of awareness and understanding in this

respect is the scope of criticism of foreign aid.

Some of the supporting and dissenting arguments clearly
reveal deficiencies on the part of the American public
in their attitudes toward foreign aid.

The following

-s�ction is an examination of the major arguments pre
sented on the subject.

23Ibid., p. 4.
24see below, Chapters III and IV.
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3.

Criticisms:

Pro and Con

Supporters of foreign aid remind the public
that five successive presidents and each Congress for
over twenty years have given bipartisan support to
foreign aid.

Yet, critics feel that the United States

is ''trying to do too much for too many too soon, that
we are over-extended in resources and under-compen
sated in results, and that no end of foreign aid is

either in sight or in mind.11 25

A great number of

critics regard aid as necessary but temporary and
believe that in time aid to certain countries can
be phased out as they reach economic
. via
. b'l't
i i y.26
When proponents refer to the successes of past pro
grams, critics argue that, in respect to the Marshall
Plan, for example, the conditions which contributed to
previous successes are not present in the under-devel
oped countries.

Therefore, they contend that such

comparisons are not valid.2 7
2

5The Scope and Distribution of United States
Military and Economic Assistance Programs. Report to
the President of the United States from the Committee
to Strengthen the Security of the Free World, March
2 0, 1963 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1963), p. 1.
26u.s. Foreign Aid, p. 9 .
5
27
Legislative Anal�sis. The Proposed Foreign
Assistance Act of 1963, 8th
Congress, First Session,
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In respect to the Communist threat and military
aspects of the question, opponents of foreign aid main
tain that the United States should concentrate on
building up only its own economy and military strength.
They view the proliferation of weapons in the world
through military aid as a danger to peace.28 Support
ers argue, however, that the national interest of the
United States can best be served by friendly countries
which are capable of countering military _threats.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk has expressed their
attitude:
I don't find that I have to make too much of
an argument away from Washington, in the l�cal
communities, on the question as to whether or
not they are willing to pay three or four
cents of their Federal tax dollar for foreign
aid to try to get this job done in the world
without committing these men to comba that
we have stationed all over the world.�9

In another vein, supporters point out that up

to the early 1960 1 s Soviet aid was steadily increasReport No. 10, October 18, 1963 (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research), p. 13.
28charles A. Cerami and Arthur Gordon, "The
Pro's and Con's of Foreign Aid," Woman's Day, March,
1965, p. 61.
29The M aking of Foreign Policy, an intervie�
with Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Bureau of Public
Affairs, Office of Media Services, U.S. Department of
State (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, March, 1964), p. 24.

18
ing.

Furthermore, Soviet aid is given on a long-term

basis and is not subject to the hazard of annual leg
islative renewai.3 0

However, critics who view aid as

temporary, favor such aid being given on a year-to
year basis.

Opponents also argue that foreigners dis

like being under obligation to the United States and
become resentful.

These critics object to giving aid

to countries which are neutral or which have opposed
us.31 Rather than believing that aid should be given
to gain friends for this country, supporters feel
that aid contributes to stopping the spread of Commu
nism by achieving political stability and economic
viability in many countries, whether they are allies
or neutrals.

The assumption that aid will promote rapid

economic growth and political stability is challenged
by critics who emphasize that economic development is
an extremely long and difficult process.

Among other

problems these countries suffer from a constantly
increasing population which sometimes outstrips eco
nomic growth.32 Critics further believe that recip30John w. Gardner, To Turn the Tide, p. 155.
3lThe Scope and Distribution of United States
Military and EconomicAssistance Programs, p. 3.
., p. 2.
32
ill£

19
ient countries must carry out more self-help measures

and internal reforms in order that aid can accomplish
developmental goals.

In contrast, supporters hold

that it is no longer possible for the weaker countries
to maintain their independence without assistance from
the stronger Free World nations.

These people favor

developmental aid for an indefinite period because
they believe that rising expectations in the develop
ing nations will continue and that it is the responsi
bility of the United States to assist in such a way
that the revolution is one of freedom and progress.
Furthermore, defenders assert that as long as some
economic progress is being made, the task is not hope
less.

At hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, Senator J. William Fulbright stated that,
"Contrary to a common impression, economic growth in

the less developed world as a whole since 1950 has
been at an unprecedented rate of 4.2 per cent per
year • • • • 1133

Other critics fear that the new businesses
and industries created in other countries as a result
of foreign aid will eventually lead to substantial
competition with the U.S. producers on the world

33u.s. Congressional Record, p. 4084.

20

market.'4

At the same time proponents cite the more

than 500,000 jobs and the over $100 million in profits
from goods sent abroad under the various programs.35
In addition, they point to another benefit to the
domestic economy, that of helping to dispose of sur
plus commodities under Public Law 480.

Increasing

concern over the contribution of foreign aid to the
persistent deficits in the U.S. balance-of-payments
has led to the charge that the deficit could be erased
by eliminating foreign aid.36 Supporters counter with
the facts which show that over 80 per cent of the
total of aid goods represents the sale of U.S. goods
and services, not dollar outflow.

Consequently, aid

is a small and steadily decreasing factor in the bal
ance-of-payments situation.

In the long-run, they

contend, it may help the problem as more foreign mar
kets resulting from aid develop for U.S. products.37
Some critics believe that other Free World
nations are not carrying their share of the foreign
assistance burden.

Defenders view foreign aid as the

34charles A. Cerami and Arthur Gordon, "The
Pro's and Con's for Foreign Aid," p. 92.
35Ibid., p. 89.
36The AID Program, p. 324.
37Norman Jacobs, Great Decisions 1964,
pp. 79-80.
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opportunity to coordinate the resources of all the
countries of the Free World and thereby present a

strong united front against the forces that would
undermine them individually.

Critics, on the other

hand, point to the problem of coordinating such an
effort.38 Yet, supporters point to the fact that each
year more countries of the Free World are giving aid
and in steadily increasing amounts.

Many people sup

port foreign aid for humanitarian reasons.

Neverthe

less, critics point to domestic needs and ask that
charity begin at home.
The foregoing illustrates the two approaches

to the subject, the two groups of people which are
diametrically opposed to each other on the issue.

Those who favor a policy of giving foreign aid empha
size the accomplishments of previous programs and now
point to the advances being made by the current one.

They cite the facts that the organization and admin
istration of aid is much more efficient today and that
aid is concentrated in only those countries which can
progress most quickly and which exert the greatest
amount of self-help.

Despite these arguments, a number

of critics maintain that giving foreign aid is like
38The Scope and Distribution of United States
Military and Economrc-Assistance Programs, pp. 2-3.
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"pouring money down a rathole."

Such people are

c0nvinced that the money spent is wasted.

They charge

that a foreign aid program only creates more govern
ment jobs and gives the Department of State greater

influence in foreign.- p_olicy matters.

CHAPTER II
CHANGES IN FOREIGN AID POLICY
1.

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to document pol
icy changes in ten aspects of the foreign assistance
program in the post World War II period.
(1)

One change is the creation of a central

ized agency which is responsible for all economic aid.
This new agency is the most recent of a proliferation
of agencies.

It has replaced a haphazard arrangement

in which several departments and agencies were in
charge of separate and sometimes over-lapping func
tions.
(2)

The basic purpose of foreign aid has grad

ually evolved from achieving limited political and
military objectives to striving toward long-range
development goals.
(3)

Another change of great significance is

that from requiring of recipient countries little more
than token loyalty to obligating them to specific com
mitments.

Now, recipient countries are required to

formulate development plans, carry out internal
reforms, and show efforts toward self-help.
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(4)

Of considerable consequence is the shift

in geographic distribution of aid from Europe to pri
marily Asia and Latin America.

(5)

Also, aid is now concentrated in ten of

the more than ninety countries which receive some
form of aid.
(6)

Furthermore, aid is now given primarily as

economic assistance instead of military aid.

(7)

It is now in the form of predominantly

loans rather than grants.
(8)

Another change, made in just the last four

years, is long-term appropriations for loans.

(9)

Also, the Peace Corps now adds the vital

element of human resources to bridge the gap between
technical assistance and unskilled nationals.
(10)

There are increased benefits to the

domestic economy.

These are in the forms of more

jobs, greater demand for certain products, creation of
more foreign markets, and disposal of some agricul
tural surplus commodities.
These ten changes in foreign aid policy are dealt with
in separate sections of this chapter.

The coverage of

each shift in policy is essentially historical in
nature.

The last section presents a brief analysis of

the relationship between the policy changes and public

25
opinion and offers some conclusions.
2.

Administration of the Program

A proliferation of administrative organizations
plagued the foreign aid program from World War II
until 1961.

The Agency for International Development

(AID), established in 1961, is the most recent of
eight major foreign aid agencies.

President John F.

Kennedy stated in his message to Congress on foreign
aid, March 24, 1961:
For no objective supporter of foreign aid can
be satisfied with the existing program-
actually a multiplicity of programs. Bureau
cratically fragmented, awkward and slow, its
administration is diffused over a haphazard
and irrational structure covering at least
four departments and several other agencies.1
From 1949 until 1961, the organization of foreign
assistance programs has gone through a series of
changes; the results have been new initials and usu
ally only minor differences in organizational con
cept.2 The report of a series of task forces set up
by President Kennedy to study the entire foreign
assistance program recommended the creation of one
1John F. Kennedy as quoted in To Turn the Tide,
edited by John w. Gardner (New York: Harper & Bros:-;1962), p. 144.
2Joseph S. Toner, 11 0rganizat-ion of Our Foreign
Aid Program," Proceedings of the Academ of Political
Science, Vol. XXVII, No. 2--CJanuary, 19�2;, p. 2.
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centralized agency.
On the basis of these recommendations, Pres
ident Kennedy proposed in March, 1961, that Congress
create one centralized aid organization (to be known
as the Agency for International Development, AID),
••• which would embrace the present Washington
and field operations of: (a) the ICA and all
its technical assistance and other programs;
(b) the DLF; (c) P.L. 480 in its relations
with other countries; (d) the local lending
activities of the Export-Import Bank; (e) the
Peace Corps; (f) the donation of non-agricul
tural surpluses; and (g) all other related
staff and program services provided by the
Department of State as well as the ICA. ?
Primary responsibility for operations was shifted from
functional offices to geographical offices.

Four

regional bureaus representing Latin America, Europe
and Africa, the Near East and South Asia, and the Far
East were established, each headed by an assistant
administrator responsible directly to the Administra
t)r of the Agency.4
3H. J.P. Arnold, Aid for Developin Countries
(Chester Springs, Pennsylvania, 1962), p. � 3. The
initials used in this quote stand for the following
agencies: ICA, International Cooperation Administra
tion; DLF, Development Loan Fund; andP.L. 480, Public
Law 480 providing for the sale of agricultural surplus
commoditiesu
4Report to the Congress 2.!! the Foreign Assist
anceProgram for the Fiscal Year 1�. Prepared under
thedirectionol' !lie Administratoro'r the Agency for
International Development with the cooperation and
participation of the Department of State and the
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The centralization and coordination of foreign
assistance under AID is in marked contrast to each of
the previous aid agencies.

The Institute of Inter

American Affairs, created in 1942, was responsible for
only technical assistance to Latin America.

The

Economic Cooperation Administration was established in
1948 to administer the European Recovery Program and
other programs.

In 1950, the Technical Cooperation

Administration was formed to carry out technical assist
ance under the Point Four program. Its activities were
transferred in June, 1953, to the newly created Mutual
Security Agency.

Two months later all the functions

of MSA were transferred to the new Foreign Operations
Administration.

This agency, in turn was superseded

by the International Cooperation Administration in
July, 1953, which was authorized to begin an economic
development assistance program for certain under-devel
oped countries.5 To permit long-term lending at rea
sonable rates of interest to countries engaged in
economic development programs, the Development Loan
Fund was created in 1957.

The last of eight foreign

Department of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern
ment Printing Office, 1963), p. 5.
5"Foreign Aid Survey," Congressional Quarterly
Almanac, Vol. XII, 1956, p. 433.
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aid agencies is the Agency for International Develop
ment of 1961.

3.

Objectives

The ultimate objectives of foreign aid have
evolved with each different program from 1947 to 1961.
However, until 1961, the objectives in each instance
were limited and short-range.

The goal of European

economic integration under the Marshall Plan was the
only objective which had long-range implications even
though.assistance was for only four years.
change took place in 1961.

An abrupt

In March of that year Pres

ident Kennedy declared in a speech before Congress:
Money spent to meet crisis situations or short
term political objectives, while helping to
maintain national integrity and independence,
has rarely moved the recipient nation toward
greater economic stability •••• 6
He went on to explain that only progress toward eco
nomic development and eventual self-sustaining growth
could assure the continued independence of under-devel
oped countries, U.S. national security and prosperity,
and the maintenance of freedom when challenged by the
Communist World.
President Kennedy was the first to call for a
6John F. Kennedy, quoted in John W. Gardner,
To Turn the�, p. 145.
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change in the_ objectives of foreign aid from short-run
objectives to long-term goals.

In 1963, AID reported:

The share of foreign aid funds that goes to
promote long-term economic and social devel
opment, rather than short-run stability and
security, has increased steadily for the
past ten years.'!

The increasing percentage of development loans in com
parison to grants and the steady decrease in the
amount spent for military aid both testify to this
change in policy objectives to long-range development
and economic growth.

Furthermore, the policy section

of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, for example,
provides that

••• every possible precaution should be taken
to prevent the use of economic development aid
funds for short-term emergency purposes or any
other purpose not essential to the long-rangS
economic development of recipient countries.

To facilitate the achievement of these long-range
goals, a detailed statement is now required with each
request for authorization of aid funds by the Admin
istration.

This statement must set forth the purpose,

7Principles of Foreign Economic Assistance,
United States Department of State, Agency for Inter
national Development, Program Coordination Staff
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1963), p. 3.
8Legislative Anal sis, The Proposed Foreign
Assistance Act of 1963, �Btfi Congress, First Session,
Report No. 10, October 18, 1963 (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research), p. 3.
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objectives, and priorities of each program so that it
can be evaluated in terms of long-range development

objectives.9 The objectives of the Marshall Plan, aid
to Greece and Turkey, and other aid programs were
short-range and temporary.

Now, in contrast, there

has clearly been a major shift in policy objectives.
This change from limited objectives to the long-range
goal of economic development underlies the foreign
assistance program of this decade.
4.

Requirements

A significant shift in foreign aid policy

resulted from a change involving the imposition of
conditions.

Today the United States insists on the

formulation of long-range development plans, the under
taking of internal reforms, and the exerting of self
help measures by each recipient country.

The condi

tions of the Marshall Plan were the first evidence of
the United States requiring such obligations of recip
ient countries.

Secretary of State George Marshall

declared that:

U.S. economic aid must not be on a piecemeal
basis as various crises develop, but must be
based on a regional plan drawn up by the
9Ibid., p. 4.
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European countries themselves. 1O
Europe organized to develop such a plan, commit itself
to self-help measures, and obtain domestic investment
and government appropriations for the purpose of eco
nomic rehabilitation.

However, after

1 952,

such

stringent requirements were not asked of other recip
ient countries.

Only limited conditions were such as

the guarantee not to use American military aid against
the United States and her allies and not to use such
aid to support Communist aggression.
The Foreign Assistance Act of

1961

restored the

more stringent qualifications earlier required of the
Marshall Plan countries.

President Kennedy emphasized

this change in his message to Congress on foreign aid
in March,

1 963:

If we encourage recipient countries to dram
atize a series of short-term crises as a basis
for our aid, instead of depending on a plan
for long-term goals, then we will dissipate
our funds, our good will, and our leadership.
Nor will we be any nearer either to our secu
rity goals or to the end of the foreign aid
burden. 11
Programming during the

ual project basis.

1 95O's

had been on an individ

Experience had demonstrated the

1OH. J. P. Arnold, Aid for Developing Coun- - - tries, p. 29.
11

John F. Kennedy as quoted by John W. Gardner
• in To Turn� Tide, p. 148.
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need for an approach based on carefully constructed
national development plans formulated by each country
in cooperation with the United States.12 President
Kennedy requested that Congress stipulate in the For
eign Assistance Act of 1961 that development plans,
self-help, and internal reforms be required of all
recipient countries.

Accordingly, these obligations
were made a part of the Act.13
Not only are these three conditions required in
order to receive aid, but they are also the criteria
on which is based the decision of the amount of aid
which each country will receive.

In defending the

position of the Administration before the Senate For
eign Relations Committee in 1963, Secretary of State
Dean Rusk testified:

We must select those countries willing to Qake
a major self-help effort or of such importance
that our aid can significantly encourage such
an effort. We must focus upon those countries
in which our assistance will provide the nec
essary margin for growth. 1 4
He emphasized that self-help is the most important
12Report to the Congress on the Foreign Assist
ance Program for Fiscal Year 1962, p. 4.
13John w. Gardner, To Turn the Tide, p. 150.
14Foreign Assistance Act of 19 3. Hearings
�
before the Committee on Fore'igri' Relations, United
States Senate, 88th Congress, First Session, June 1 1 July 1 1 , 1963 (Washinston, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1963), p. 8.
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single factor in the development process and that
there must be a real commitment by the people them
selves to the achievement of progress and economic
development.
5.

Geographic Distribution

There has been a significant change in geo
graphic distribution of foreign aid since 1948.

The

Marshall Plan, the first major foreign aid program,
was focused almost exclusively on Europe.

As the coun

tries in Europe recovered their economic strength and
ability to support their own defense efforts, foreign
aid gradually shifted during the mid-1950 1 s to the Far
East and South Asia.

With the Alliance for Progress,

established in 1961, Latin America became another
focus for foreign aid.15 Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Com
mittee in 1964, stated:
The countries of Western Europe and Japan--a
total of 14--were once major recipients of
economic assistance. They now receive no
such aid from the United States, have become
growing, prosperous nations> and have foreign
aid programs of their own. lo
From 1954 until 1959, the Far East received steadily

p. 2.

l5Principles of Foreign Economic Assistance,
16Foreign Assistance Act of 1963,
p.

7.
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increasing proportions of military aid coupled with
economic assistance.

As of 1959, the geographic dis

tribution of foreign aid reveals that Asia and Latin
America receive over three-quarters of the total for
eign aid given by the United States.17
The change from directing aid to advanced coun
tries to giving it to the under-developed nations of
primarily Asia and Latin America can be shown statis
tically.18 The figures in Table 1, which appears on
the following page, indicate a profound drop in the
total amounts appropriated for Europe from 1949 to
1964, as compared to Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
Countries of the Far East, Near East, and South Asia
were the first to be included in the shi!t in distribu
tion.

Since 1953, these regions have consistently

received the largest portion of the foreign aid expend
itures.

Latin America receives the second largest

amount now.

In fiscal year 1965, no economic aid will

be given to European countries.

The change in geo-

17 u.s. Foreign Aid: Its Purposes, Scope, Admin
istration, and Related Information. Prepared by Leg
islative Reference Service, U.S. Library of Congress
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
June 11, 1959), p. 46.
18operations Report.
Data as of June 30, 1964
(Washington, D.C.: Agency for International Develop
ment FY 1964).

TABLE 1
TREND OF A.I.D. AND PREDECESSOR AGENCY EXPENDITURES*
BY APPROPRIATION CATEGORY OF ASSISTANCE
By Fiscal Year Periods, 1949-1964
(Thousands of Dollars)
REGION
EUROPE
LATIN AMERICA
FAR EAST, NEAR
EAST, ASIA
AFRICA

Marshall
Plan Period_
1949-1952 1953-1957

Mutual Security Act Period
1960
1959
1958

·--

1961

78,174
127,879
111,463
117,553
11,493,847 3,137,422
86,789
95,997
118,873
64,538
187,096
10,182
1,418,766 4,871,520 1,068,002 1,099,206 1,139,028 1,138,132
2,132

66,442

40,702

80,855

147,291

178,525

13,117,489 8,865,507 1,438,601 1,529,840 1,619,823 1,800,669
GRAND TOTAL
Per Cent of Tota]
B.296
8.3%
35.4%
87.6%
4.8%
6.1%
to Europe
*Operations Report. Data as of June 30, 1964 (Washington, D.C.:
for International Development FY 1964), p. 32.

Agency
\),I
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TABLE 1-- Continued

REGION

Foreign Assistance Act Period
1963
1964
1962

Total
1949-1964

EUROPE
LATIN AMERICA
FAR EAST, NEAR
EAST, ASIA
AFRICA

19,375 15,215,276
36,513
93,051
316,138
282,396 1,447,472
285,413
1,036,338 1,345,396 1,235,527 14,351,910

GRAND TOTAL
Per Cent of Total
to Europe

1,830,935 2,031,214 1,975,424' 34,209,502
1.7%
5.0%
.9%

200,258

157,121

144,786

�
CJ)
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graphic distribution of foreign aid from the advanced
countries of Europe to the under-developed countries
of Asia and Latin America has been completed.
6.

Geographic Concentration

From 1952 until 1960, foreign aid lacked geo

graphic focus.

It was characterized for about ten

years by wide disbursement and spasmodic concentration
due to occasional crises.

With the change in purpose

to economic development, it became necessary for this
country to establish more strict criteria on which to
base the amount of aid given to·each country.

The

most prominent moves in the direction of greater selec
tivity began in 1961.

President Kennedy recommended a

concentration of aid on those few countries which
could absorb large amounts, exert the greatest self
help efforts, and were closest to economic self-sus
This is now the policy of the United
States in giving aid.�9
tained growth.

The results of this policy change show a con
siderable concentration of each type of aid on a very
limited number of countries.

At present, over ninety

l9John w. Gardner, To Turn the Tide, p. 146.
For more details of the President'sviewsand rec
ommendation, see his address to Congress on foreign
aid in March, 1961.

38
countries receive some type of aid.

However, in

respect to the geographic concentration of aid, David
E. Bell, Director of the Agency for International
Development, estimated that in FY 1964:
20 countries received 80 per cent of total
economic aid,
10 countries received 80 per cent of total
military aid,
6 countries received 80 per cent of develop-

ment loan funds,
6 countries of Latin America received 80 per

cent of Alliance for Progress loans, and
7 countries received 80 per cent of supporting
assistance.20
FIGURES 1 and 2 which appear on the following pages
indicate the concentration of total aid in FY 1964.

Ten countries received 72 per cent of all aid given.21
This shift in policy is even more evident in
the disbursement of aid appropriated for FY 1965.
Mr. Bell stated that plans called for 78 per cent of
all aid to be concentrated in twenty-five countries.
These countries were divided into three categories:
20Foreign
.
A t £_
f �
10h6-;z, ' p. 574 •
Assis
. tance _£_
210perat·ions Report, p 8
• •
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FIGUE.E 1
A. I .D. OBLIGATIOl'JS - Hi) Lo� E .. UTHORIZATIOI:rn
DURING FISC�tL YE.�R 1964•:1DIVISIC1'i O? CCUl,T?.Y • ID

___J 10 ( ~----·····

, _,:::gest Countri"s
. .. j· with 72% 1-·
...........,.,...... .

Tot I $1,988
* Ex�!udes

_�

.,

I

�

·1 ion*

$284 million non-regional and othor old �ot identified with particular countries.
-

•!:•ouerati ons Renart. Data as of June 30, 1964
(Washington, D.C.: Agency fo: International Developmant, 1964), p. 8.
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FIGURE 2
A.I.D. OBLIGATICES AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS
TEN LARGEST �ID R:i'.CIPIENTS IN FY 1964
(Millions of Dollars)

�------ .
India
Pakistan
I Brazil
Viet Nam

Tu I ey
Korea
Colombia
Chile

t·

'

=====:J

236
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:
1
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,-.
I

1 ·:': ]
.

1

132

166

109

j 19

�- 1

Bolivia

· ', ::: ,� '.' ] 344

79

58
46

Nigeria

•::•operations Report. De.ta as of June 30, 1964
(� ashington, D. C .: Agency for International Develop
ment, 1964), p. 8.

i!.:,

41
Group 1.

Seven countries which have fully

effective development programs underway, are
fully committed to the development process,
and are mobilizing their own resources effec
tively will receive 50 per cent.
Group 2.

Eleven countries are to receive

qualified development support amounting to 17
per cent of the total.
Group

3.

Seven countries, which are. security

cases in which basic internal security must be
·
achieved first, will receive 11 per cent.22
President Johnson made a statement in 1964

which expresses the official view toward geographic
concentration of foreign aid:
In this program we do not seek to cover the
whole world.· Aid on a worldwide scale is no
part of our purpose. We seek instead, through
prudent and responsible programs, to help
carefully selected countries whose survival in
freedom is essential, and whose collapse would
bring new opportunities for Communist expan
sion. 23

The selection of countries is based on their

22Foreign Assistance 19�4. Hearings before
the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Sen
ate, 88th Congress, 2 nd Session (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 260.
23Message from The President of the United
States, transmitting R'ecommendationsRelative to For
eign Assistance to the House of Representatives, 88th
Congress, 2nd Session, Document No. 250 (Washington,
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level of development.

In the primary group there are

about thirty countries which show evidence of advance
ment and concerted efforts of self-help.

Their pros

pects for solid and lasting development are good.
Only about eleven per cent of all U.S. economic aid
funds goes to the forty-seven countries in the second

group of countries in which development is in its
early stages.

There, large amounts of capital aid

could not be absorbed usefully for many years.

Very

few countries fall into the third group which is com
prised of those countries which receive aid only to
strengthen their internal security or to stave off a
Communist threat. 24
It is anticipated that there will be a gradual
phasing out of aid to certain countries as they
achieve economic viability.

The high degree of selec

tivity and concentration of aid has enabled Director
Bell to name six countries which are expected to
achieve economic viability by 1968:

Taiwan, Greece,

Israel, Mexico, Venezuela and the Philippines.

He

names India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Colombia as making
D.C.:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 2.
24Norman Jacobs, (ed.), Great Decisions 1964
(New York: The Foreign Policy Association, 196in-;
p. 74.
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very substantial progress toward self-sustaining eco
nomic growth.25 Senator J. William Fulbright stated

in January, 1965, that seventeen countries have moved
The

from the need for foreign aid to self-support.

economic aid programs have been ended in fifteen
European countries, Japan and Lebanon.

The need for

U.S. foreign aid is drawing to a close in fourteen
·
26 Supcountries
of Asia,
and Lt·
a in Arnerica.
.
.
Africa,
.
porting assistance was terminated in sixteen coun
tries in FY 1964.27
7.

Military and Economic Aid

One of the most profound changes in foreign aid
policy has been the shift in emphasis from military
aid to predominantly economic aid.

Beginning in the

late 1940's and continuing through the 1950's, one of
the means by which the United States sought to contain
Communism was through expanding military aid.

Also,

economic assistance, which made it po·ssible for cer
tain less-developed countries to concentrate on
25Ibid., p. 5.
7
26u.s. Congressional Record, Proceedings and
Debates ofthe 89th Congress, First Session, Vol. 111,
No. 10 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1965), p. 785.
27Foreign Assistance Act of !.2.§2, p. 252.
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defense build-ups, was emphasized.28

The Cold War

thus served to give foreign aid a military orientation.
The Korean conflict heightened the military emphasis
in foreign aid and it was not until the late 1950's
that the threat of Communist aggression subsided.

By

1963 aid to increase military strength and to bolster
economies of the countries around the periphery of the
Communist Bloc had been cut by more than one-third.29
This new policy of reducing the amount of military aid
was adopted toward recipient countries around the
The figures and percentages shdwn in Table 2
and Table 3 clearly reveal the change.30 The excep

world.

tions are FY 1963 and FY 1964 appropriations which
are both indicative of an opposite trend and of cuts
made by Congress in the total amounts appropriated.
8.

Grants and Loans

A significant change in the form of aid has
been the steadily increasing percentage of loans as

p. 39.

28tt. J. P. Arnold, Aid for Developing Countries,

29Foreign Assistance Act of !.2.§.2, p. 3.
30see Ibid., p. 18, and Operations Report, pp.
50-57. The dollar figures are given in the publication
as presented here. The percentages, however, are based
on those figures and were calculated only for this
study.

TABLE 2

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT PROGRAM APPROPRIATIONS*
(Millions of Dollars)

-

1953

U.S. Fiscal Years

1959

196 1

1962 1963: 1964

19 46- 48

19 49-5 2

14,536

22,190

6,885 5,83 1 5, 195 5,598 5, 421 5,37 1 5,735 5,217 5,880 6,6 11 3,929 3, 489
1

Economic

1 4,055

19,351

2,6 13 2,4 19 2,686 2,620

Military

48 1

2,839

96.7

87 • 2

-

PROGRAM

-

Total
I

--

-

Per Cent
Economic of
the Total

4 , 27 2

I

195 4

1955

1956

1957

1958

1960

3, 287 2,967 3,57 4 3,37 2 4, 426 5,08 4 2,60 4

1

2 , 289

3, 412 2,509 2,979 2, 13 4 2, 404 2,160 1,81-6 1, 45 4 1 1,526 l,3 25 I,200.

1-

I

·-

37 • 91 41. 5 ! 51. 6 I 46 . 8 50.5 55.2 62.3 6 4 .6 ! 75.2 76.9 66. 2 ) 65.6
1
I

•operations Report. Data as of June 30, 1964 (Washington, D.C.:
for International Development FY 1964), p. ,56.

Agency
.p
\.11

TABLE 3
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT PROGRAM EXPENDITURES*

�ROGRAM

1946-48 1949-5 2

(Millions of Dollars)
--1
1953 1954 1955 1956l 1957l 1958 1959 1960 I 196 I \ 1962 196311964

Total

-

15,6 27 6,048 4,809 4,530 I 4,638 3,708 3,802 3,640 3,338 3,175 3,279 2,03 2 1,976

Economic

-

13,110 1,889 1,513 2, 135 1,711 1,623 1,439 1,530 1,620 1,801 l, 831 1,528 h,598

Military

-

ber Cent
�conomic of
he Total
j

2,517 4,159 3, 296 2,396 2,928 2,085 2,363 2,110 1,718 1,374 I ,448

I

83.8

504

378

31.2 31.4 47. l I 36.9 43.8 37.8 4 2 .0 48.5 56. 7 56.1 75. 2 84.9 j
1
I
1

*Operations Report. Data as of June )J, 1964 (Washington, D.C.:
for International Development FY 1964-), p. 57.

Agency
�
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compared to grants.

As an indication of this shift in

emphasis, the statistics in FIGURE

3

reveal that the

amount of loans increased from one per cent to sixty
two per cent of the total aid commitments from FY 1953

to FY 1964.3 1

During the Marshall Plan period loans

amounted to only eleven per cent of the total commit
ments from 1949 to 1952. 3 2

As late as 1957, four

fifths of all aid funds were in the form of grants.
However, in FY 1964, development loans made up three
fifths of all aid funds.33

Several reasons account

for this change in emphasis from grants to loans.

Dur

ing the first year of President Kennedy's Administra
tion, efforts to reduce a persistently unfavorable
balance-of-payments may have been a factor which served
to encourage the shift from grants to loans. 3 4
Another major argument in favor of giving a
greater percentage of loans than grants is that repay
able loans tend to make the recipient governments more
frugal.

The politics of foreign aid in the United
3 louerations
3 2Ibid.,

Reuort, p. 5.

p. 6.

3 3charles A. Cerami and Arthur Gordon, 11 The
Pro's and Con's of Foreign Aid, 11 Woman's Day, March,
1965, p. 60.
3 4see

pages 53 -56.

FIGURE 3
LOANS AS PERCENT OF TOTAL COMMITMENTS BY A.I.D.
� ��l949-1964•
AND PREDECESSOR AGENCIES, F�
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*Operations Report. Data as· of June 30, 1964 (Washington, D.C.:
for International Development FY 1964), p. 5.
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States, however, was the primary factor responsible
for the change from grants to loans.

It was also

argued that the giving of grants tends to make the
people of recipient countries feel under too much
obligation to the United States.

Loans, in contrast,

tend to strengthen a sense of self-respect and ade
quacy for these people.

9.

Length of Appropriations

For the first time in the history of foreign
aid, the United States Congress passed in 1961 a long
term authorization for loans and a teh-year commitment
to the Alliance for Progress.

Before the passage of

the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, President Kennedy
urged before Congress:
A program based on long-range plans instead of
short-run crises cannot be financed on a short
term basis. Long-term authorization, planning,
and financing are the key to the continuity and
efficiency of the entire program. If we are
unwilling to make such a long-term commitment,
we cannot expect any increased response from
other potential donors or any re&listic plan
ning from the recipient nations. )>
Congress agreed that uneven and undependable short
term financing had served to weaken the incentive for
long-term planning and self-help by recipient nations.
35John F. Kennedy as quoted in John
Turn the Tide, p. 15.

w.

Gardner, To
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Congress herein recognized the limitations involved in
n�tions having to design projects to match the rhythm
of the U.S. fiscal year.

Clearly, a new approach in

authorizations was needed in order to coincide with
the new objectives and to correct previous defects in
foreign aid policy.
Accordingly, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
authorized a five-year program of long-term develop
ment lending.

The Act stipulated:

Subject only to annual appropriations and to
criteria stated in the law, commitments for
long-term loans can be made under this author
ity on such terms anct conditions as the Pres
ident may determine. 5 6
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 provided a similar·
five-year authorization for loans under the Alliance
for Progress.37

With economic development as the

focal point of present foreign aid policy, the United
States has pledged $1 billion a year throughout the
current decade to the Alliance for. Progress.

Sim

ilarly, the United States has made long-term commit
ments to India and Nigeria.38
36Report to the Congress on the Foreign Assist
ance Program for Fiscal Year 1962, p. 2.

37u.s.

Congressional Record, p. 4083.
38Norman Jacobs, Great Decisions 1964, p. 72.
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10.

Human Resources

Prior to the fall of 1961, foreign aid had con
sisted of g�ants, loans, material goods, and technical
assistance.

A grave deficiency in the foreign aid

process was the lack of trained manpower in the recip
ient countries.

President Kennedy recognized this

deficiency and advocated the creation of a Peace Corps
for reasons stated in his message to Congress in March
of 1961:
One of the greatest obstacles to the achieve
ment of this goal &conomic and social progres_il
is the lack of trained men and women with the
skill to.teach the young and assist in the
operation of development projects •••• The
vast task of economic development urgently
req�ires ski ed people to do the work of the
society ••••

39

He went on to explain that the Peace Corps would dif
fer from existing assistance programs in that its
members would supplement technical advisers by offer
ing the specific skills needed by developing nations
if they were to put technical advice to work.
By March, 1965, there were approximately 10,000
volunteers in more than 3,000 different locations in
forty-six countries.40 Its activities in each country
39John F. Kennedy as quoted in John W. Gardner,
.
To Turn the Tide, p. 157.
40 u.s. Congressional Record, p. 3998.
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are conducted separately from those of the Embassy and

other United States agencies, but Peace Corps offi

cials consult with the Embassy and the AID mission in
the field as well as with the Department of State and
AID in Washington.

The Peace Corps projects and AID

programs are coordinated whenever possible so as to

contribute to priority goals and to avoid duplication
an d compet·t·
1 ion. 41 The objectives of these activities,
as stated by Congress, are:
To help the peoples of interested countries
and areas in meeting their needs for trained
manpower, and to help promote a better under
standing of the American people on the part
of the peoples served and a·better under
standing of othe peoples on the part of the
American people. 42
These objectives relate to the middle level of man
power between highly skilled technical experts and the

predominant�y unskilled population of most of the
under-developed countries.
11.

Benefits to the Domestic Economy

Concern about the effects of foreign aid on the
domestic economy has led to additional changes in pol
icy.

A point of concern involves the contribution of
41F oreign Assistance Act of 1963, p. 45.
42Ibid.
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foreign aid to the international balance-of-payments
deficit of the United States.

The United States has

experienced an unfavorable balance of payments since
the mid-1950's.

Since 1959 the size of the deficit

has been mitigated by the

11

Buy American" drive.

Under the Buy American Act, passed during the Depres
sion, American producers are given preference in pro
viding aid goods if their prices do not greatly exceed
foreign bids.43 From 1960 to 1964, the U.S. suppliers'
share of aid commodity purchases has increased stead
ily from 40 per cent to 87 per cent.
6 indicate this trend.

FIGURES 4, 5, and

As a result, the granting of

economic aid has relatively little effect on the U.S.
balance-of-payments.44 The deficit is being further
reduced by the repayment of loans made to European
countries under the Marshall Plan.
As a consequence of these developments the ben
efits to the domestic economy of foreign aid are now
being emphasized.

Not only does the tying of aid to

U.S. products increase exports by over $900 million
annually, but, also foreign markets for U.S. goods
43Peter B. Kenen, Giant Among Nations: Prob
lems in United States Foreign Economic Policy
(Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1963), p. 78.
44The AID Program, p. 48.
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FIGURE 4
EXPENDITURES IN THE U.S. AND OTHER SOURCES AS

PERCENT OF TOTAL A.I.D. COMMODITY EXPENDITURES•
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FIGURES 5 and 6
EXPENDITURES IN THE U.S. AND OTHER SOURCES AS

PERCENT OF TOTAL A.I.D. COMMODITY EXPENDITURES
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have expanded among countries formerly receiving U.S.
assistance.45 Therefore, the foreign aid program is
actually increasing exports and, thus, helping to
correct the imbalance.

The sale of surplus agricul

tural commodities under Public Law 480 has resulted
in over $1 billion in sales each y�ar since 1954.46
This program, called Food for Peace, has provided the
Government with a means of helping to dispose of a
sizable percentage of surplus goods.

Also, a portion

of the material resources given in the past few years
has involved the use of surplus national stockpile
materials.47
Rather indirect and scarcely realized by the
American public is a related set of benefits traceable
to foreign aid�

The giving of aid, for example, cre

ates more than half a million jobs for Americans.

It

finances an increasing percentage of exports and
builds new foreign markets.

These combine to create

greater profits for many Americans.

Also, foreign

aid makes possible the stationing of three and one45Allan Nevins, (ed.), !he Burden and the Glory
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1964),p. 147.
46operations Report, p. 106.

47Report to the Congress on the Foreign Assist
ance Program forFiscal Year 196T, p:-52.
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half million allied troops along the Communist periph
ery at one-tenth of the cost of maintaining a compara
ble number of American soldiers.48 One can conclude
that foreign aid is contributing significantly to
economic prosperity in the United States as well as in
the recipient countries.
12.

Conclusion

It is contended in this thesis that many crit
icisms of foreign aid policy made by the American pub
lic have already been met by one or more of the ten
policy changes.

For example, the charge that foreign

assistance is poorly administered must now take account
of the centralization of aid administration in the
Agency for International Development.

The current

long-range development goals serve as a reply to those
who criticize aid as stop-gap measures intended only
to win friends for the United States.

Another indict

ment against foreign aid policy holds that it is
wasted because the people in recipient countries do
not help themselves and misuse the aid.

New American

aid policy, however, now requires recipient countries
to formulate development plans, institute internal

p. 145.

48Allan Nevins, The Burde:1 and the Glory,
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reforms, and carry out self-help measures.

The shift

in geographic distribution of aid from Europe to Asia
and Latin America primarily and the concentration of
aid in ten countries both meet the attacks of those
who believe aid is given indiscriminately and that
too much is being attempted for too many too soon.
Critics who blame the balance-of-payments deficit on
foreign aid are unaware of or disregard some pertinent
facts.

Statistics show that exports in 1964 were

increased by one-eighth, approximately 500,000 jobs
are created for the production of aid goods, and actu
ally foreign aid has little effect on the balance-of
payments deficit.

These are only a few examples of

how criticisms of foreign aid can be viewed in rela
tion to policy changes.
In order to determine the relationship between
public opinion and changes in foreign aid policy, the
next chapter deals with national opinion surveys.
Presented will be the results of survey questions
which correspond to the policy changes cited and atti
tudes toward foreign aid in general.

An attempt will

be made to explore the relationship between survey
results and policy changes.

The purpose is to eval

uate public awareness and understanding of policy
changes and, in that way, determine their impact on
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public opinion and the possible effects of opinion
on the formulation of foreign aid policy.

CHAPTER III
NATIONAL SURVEYS OF PUBLIC OPINION
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the
relationships between changes in foreign aid policy
and public opinion.

In order to examine these rela

tionships, as a first step, the policy changes have
been identified.

The next step is to trace the course

of public opinion, as measured in national surveys,
toward those aspects of foreign aid policy which have
undergone changes.

The impact of changes on public

opinion and the possible effects of opinion on policy
changes are examined in each instance.
The surveys cited in this chapter were con
ducted by two major polling institutions, the American
Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO, Gallup Poll) and
the National Opinion Research Center (NORC).
sources of survey data have been used.

Two

One is an

occasional report published by the National Opinion
Research Center which gives a summary and analyses of
surveys made from 1943 to 1957.

The other source is

copies of survey results and cross-tabulations from

the Roper Public Opinion Research Center which has

statistics on file of surveys made from 1953 to 1963,

which include questions concerning foreign aid.
60
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people interviewed represent a cross-section of adult
1
A mericans.
.
Approximately four out of five Americans voice
relatively internationalist opinions and attitudes on
general continuing aspects of foreign relations.

In

respect to foreign aid, however, there has been a per
sistent view on the part of the American public that
it is a temporary policy.2 During World War II, Amer
icans almost unanimously recognized the need for aid
in some countries after the war.

In October, 1947, a

poll revealed that 78 per cent of the people inter
viewed approved of measures designed to give immediate
assistance and relief to the nations of Europe.3

From 1948 through 1952, the results of seventeen
1The samples in each survey include persons
twenty-one years of age or older, resident within the
continental United States, civilian, non-institutional
population. Both men and women were interviewed. The
levels of education range from no schooling to comple
tion of a college education. The occupations include:
professional, semi-professional, farmers, farm man
agers, proprietors, managers, officials, clerical,
sales, craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers, opera
tives, service workers, farm laborers, laborers,
except farm and mine, retired, unemployed, pensioner,
housewife, married women, and student.
2James N. Rosenan, National Leadership and
Foreign Policy, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1963), p. 105.
3occasional Report, National Opinion Research
Center (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press,
1957), p.·4·.
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national surveys revealed that approximately two
thirds of the people interviewed approved of the Mar
shall Plan, were satisfied with it, and felt that it
.

was a good idea. 4

Public opinion regarding the con-

tinuance of foreign aid is somewhat divided.

Generally

speaking, Americans have expressed impatience over the
fact that the tasks confronting foreign aid have not
yet been completed.

Ultimately, many people are impa

tient because fas�er progress is not being made.

In

1958, a trend in attitudes was indicated when only
50.8 per cent of the people interviewed by AIPO favored
foreign aid.

In the same poll, 32.7 per cent were
against foreign aid.5 Although apparently there was
still one-third of the respondents who were against
foreign aid, supporters dropped frorµ two-thirds to one
half of the total interviewed in each of eighteen sur
veys during a ten-year period.

Nevertheless, other

survey results show that a considerable number of peo4Ibid. ,· p. 9.
5AIPO, Survey #596, March 4, 1958. The Roper
Public Opinion Research Center, xerox reproductions
of the results and cross-tabulations of national
opinion surveys conducted from 1953 through 1963, by
the American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO) and
the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), which are
on file at Roper, Willia s College, Williamstown,
Massachusetts, (May, 1965). Hereinafter, individual
surveys cited are from statistics on file at Roper
Public Opinion Research Center.

ple feel that if aid were stopped, the possibility of
a country turning Communist would be increased.

Also,

many people have indicated that they believe foreign
aid was the key factor in the recovery of Europe from
World War II.
A matter of particular concern to many people
and one of the points of contention in Congress each
year when it considers a new foreign aid bill is the
total amount to be appropriated.

NORC, in 1957, asked

respondents if they felt the amount being spent for
foreign aid was too much, not enough, or about right.
While 48 per cent were satisfied with the total amount
spent, 37 per cent of the people interviewed believed
that too much was being spent for foreign aid.6 The
fact that over one-third of the total respondents felt
that the amount should be cut may account for a con
siderable number of the critics of foreign aid.
Whether such critics favor merely reducing the amount
spent on foreign aid, or favor eliminating the program
is unclear from the results presented here.
In 1956 and 1957, NORC asked people if they
thought it would be a good idea or a bad idea to put
economic aid on a long-term continuing basis with the
6NORC Survey #156/404, April, 1957.
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United States agreeing to contribute for a period of
years.

Table 4 shows the results of those surveys.

Even though more respondents favored long-term·appro
priations in 1957 than in 1956, in both ye�rs less
than a majority of the people supported the idea.

In

fact, over one-half of the respondents believed that
it is a bad idea.
Perhaps pe?ple have been reluctant to support
a policy of appropriating some foreign aid for longer
than one year at a time because of certain apprehen
sions.

Although the point was not tested explicitly

in the survey, it could be that people feel the United
States might lose too much control over foreign aid
if it made long-term commitments. · Others may feel
apprehensive about trusting recipient countries to
remain stable for any longer than one year at a time.
When the surveys were made, the majority opinion was,
in effect, an endorsement of the prevailing policy
of annual appropriations.

Yet, despite the apparent

lack of widespread public support, Congress, in 1961,
passed a five year appropriation for development
loans.

In addition, Congress committed itself to

contribute approximately twenty billion dollars dur
ing the decade of the 1960's to Latin America under
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TABLE 4

1956 7
1957 8

Good Idea

Bad Idea

25%

65%

39.1%

51.596

Don't Know

No Answer

.2%

7NORC Survey, #150/382, January 26, 1956.
8NORC Survey, #156/404, April, 195 .
7
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the

lliance for Progress. 9

Evidently Congress was

not affected in its decisions by what may be regarded
as a lack of support by the majority of people for
such a policy.
In another point tested in the surveys, most
people indicated support for giving aid to under
developed countries to raise their standards of liv
ing.

�De survey results of Table 5 show that support

for giving aid to such countries has increased during
a six-year period from 72 per cent to 79 per cent.
The increase in the percentage of respondents who
favor aid to under-developed countries is evidence of
the steady decline of isolationist sentiments in the
United States.

Furthermore, it indicates a willing

ness to have the United States play a major role in
achieving economic development throughout the world.
Because of this strong feeling in favor of giving aid
to under-developed countries, it may be that the Ken
nedy Administration was encouraged to make the rec
ommendations which it did in this respect in 1961.
Also, congressional support of-the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1 961 may have been strengthened.

Furthermore,

this public support of aid to under-developed coun9suura, pp. 49 -50.

TABLE 5 10
-· .

--- - .. -----

In general, do you think it is a good policy for the United States to
try to help backward countries in the world to raise their standard of living,
or shouldn't this be any concern of our government?"
11

Date

March 1949
November 1959
April 1950
November 1950
February 1952
August 1952
March 1955

Good Policy to Helo

No Concern of Ours

7296

2396
2096

75%
73%
62%
69%
7396

79%

22%
31%
27%
2 3%
18 %

Don't Know

5%
5%
5%
7%
4%
4%
3%

10 occasional Report, p. 16.
0\
--..;J
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tries parallels the new emphasis in the purpose of for
Aign aid.

As set forth in the Foreign Assistance Act

of 1961, the basic purpose is to help under-developed
nations achieve long-range economic growth and via
bility.
There is rather conclusive evidence of what
people feel should be required of recipient countries
in their answers to a survey made by NORG in 1947.
When asked whether or not they would favor providing
sixteen to twenty billion dollars in assistance to
West Europe if those countries made a real effort to
get together and help themselves, 71 per cent said
yes, 23 per cent, no, and 6 per cent didn't know.11
The results of this survey lead to at least two con
clusions when related to support of aid to under. developed countries as that policy has developed in
later programs.

Perhaps most of the people who favor

aid to under-developed countries might also prefer
that the recipients be required to formulate develop
ment plans and to help themselves.

It could also be

that some people would favor aid to under-developed
countries only if the recipients had to meet those two
requirements.

It is evident that about three-quarters

11occasional Report, p. 4.
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of the people interviewed should be satisfied with the
changes made by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
requiring development plans and self-help.
A key question since World i:Tar II has been the
relative importance and the proper proportions of mil�
itary aid and economic aid.

lthough unericans approve

of both, they tend to consider economic aid more impor
tant.

The Natic:�al Opinion Research Center examined

views on this matter in a series of surveys made over

a five-year period.

The results shovm in Table 6 bear

out the conclusion that by 1956, well over a majority
of the people interviewed believed that economic aid
is more important than military aid.

Although people

indicate this preference in increasing proportions,
there seems to be little difference in attitudes
to·ward the two when people are asked where reductions
should be made. 13

Nevertheless, the growing trend of

feeling that economic aid is more important than mil
itary aid is paralleled by a major shift in policy.
From 1948 until 1958, over half of forei5n aid was for
military assistance • . Since that time, economic aid
has steadily increased in proportion to military aid
until it became approximately twice as great as mil13 occasional

Report, p. 15.

TABLE 6 12

A. "As things are now, which would you say is most important--to
send them /r.e., friendly countri�V economic aid like machinery
and supplies, or to send them military aid like tanks and guns?"
B. "As things are now, is it more important to send our allies
economic aid, like machinery and supplies, or to send them mil
itary aid, like tanks and guns?"
Date

Question

June 1951
October 1951
November 195 1
August 1952
June 1956

A
A
A
B
B

12occasional Report,
p.

Economic Aid

!j:i._:L_ it�l:'J': Aid

Don't Know

51%
52%
4956
4 596
71 %

27%
29%
34%
37%
17%

22%
19%
1 7%
1 8%
12%

------ --

--

1 5.
�
0
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itary aid in FY 1964.14
With respect to the geographic distribution of
aid, people were asked by AIPO in 1953, if they would
approve or disapprove of a policy of giving less eco
nomic and military aid to Western Europe and more to
Allies in Asia.

Of the total number of people inter

viewed, 41.6 per cent approved, 26.1 per cent dis
approved, and 24.6 per cent had no opinion.15
Although many people might favor aid to Europe for
other reasons, one explanation might be that people
were unaware that Europe had almost recovered from the
devastation of World War II and no longer needed large
amounts of aid.

During the mid-1950's, there was a

gradual shift in the geographic distribution of aid
from Europe to Asia.

Since 1961, the proportion of
aid given to Latin America has also increased.16
Some critics seriously question the benefits of
foreign aid to the United States.

Yet, the results of

surveys appear to indicate that people generally feel
that the United States has benefited from giving aid.
Two surveys conducted in 1945, revealed that 78 per
14Supra,
pp. 43-44.
l5AIPO, Survey #514, April 17, 1953.
16Supra,
pp. 33-37.
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cent of the respondents felt that helping other coun
tries by giving aid would increase the chances for
prosperity in the United States after the war.17
Seventy per cent of the people interviewed in April,
1950, thought that helping backward countries would
really help the United States in c�rtain ways.18 In
1954, the Government began to emphasize the "Buy Amer
ican" plan which has involved tying most aid funds to
the purchase of American products.

This has resulted

in more jobs and more profits for Americans.

At the

same time, Public Law 480 was passed which provided
for the disposal of some surplus agricultural commod
ities through what is called the Food for Peace pro
gram.19 These policies should, therefore, find wide
public support since both clearly stimulate the domes
tic economy.
Cross-tabulation of these surveys as to age,
education, occupation, and level of income show that
in some cases these variables have a significant
effect on the answers given.

People between the ages

of twenty-five and forty-five gave much greater sup17occasional Report, p. 20.
18Ibid.
19supra,
pp. 52-57.
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port than others to such policies as more economic
aid than military, aid to under-developed countries,
and long-term appropriations.

Support for these pro

grams was greater among the better educated people.
People with less formal education were more likely to
answer "Don't know."

Also, people in the professional

and semi-professional categories were more inclined
than people in other occupations to support these pol
icies.

Differences in level of income apparently had

little effect on attitudes, for no definite correla
tion was evident.
In summation, people have generally regarded
foreign aid as a temporary policy.

Approximately one

half of the people interviewed feel that the amount of
aid given is sufficient.

Even though the amount of

aid has been steadily reduced since 1951, over one
third of the respondents believe that it is too much.
Either these people are not aware of the decrease or
simply do not feel the United States should give much
aid.

In 1961, Congress approved the granting of

development loans for a period of five years and com
mitted the United States to contribute twenty billion
dollars to Latin America throughout this decade under
the Alliance for Progress.

Yet, before and even since

that policy change little over one-third of the

74

respondents supported such a policy.

This would seem

to �ndicate that public opinion was insignificant as
a determiner of foreign aid policy in this case.

Dur

ing the 1950's and more recently, there has been
strong support for giving aid to under-developed coun
tries.

The change in purpose of foreign aid in this

direction, as of 1961, may, in part, be a reflection
of this attitude.

A policy trend began in the late

1950's, but aid to under-developed countries was
adopted as the primary emphasis in 1961.

This policy

change was supported by approximately four out of five
Americans interviewed.
Similar support is found for the current policy
of requiring recipient countries to formulate develop
ment plans and to help themselves.

About three-quar

ters of the people interviewed have favored such a
policy.

Since 1957, there has been a steady increase

in the amount of economic aid as compared to military
aid.

Economic aid in 1964 amounted to twice as much

as military aid.

This policy change runs parallel to

the increasing trend in attitude toward favoring eco
nomic aid over military aid which now amounts to
nearly 75 per cent of the respondents.

Even though

there has been a steady decrease in aid to Western
Europe since 1952, and more aid given to Asia, only
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slightly over half of the respondents favored such a
policy even as late as

1959.

The United States has

always received benefits to the domestic economy from
giving foreign aid.

The0e are in the forms of more

jobs, greater profits, and increased prosperity.
According to national surveys, however, over one-third
of those interviewed failed to recognize any of these
benefits.

This may be due to a lack of knowledge or

simply the result of preconceived ideas to the effect
that the only benefits of foreign aid go to the recip
ient countries.
Although in some cases trends in public-opinion
run parallel to changes in foreign aid policy, in some
instances a considerable number of people hold views
These discrep

which run counter to policy changes.

ancies are probably due to a lack of awareness of the
facts and a lack of understanding of certain policies.
Otherwise, the only other explanation is that people
hold to their preconceived notions with or without
being informed of the facts involved.

There is no

conclusive evidence offered here that attitudes of the
American public have been important factors in the
formulation of foreign aid policy.

It would appear

that public opinion has had no measurable positive
effect on foreign aid policy.

Even though public
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opinion does not appear to influence effectively
the initiation of policy changes, in most cases the
majority of public opinion runs parallel to foreign
aid policy.
The results of national surveys serve the
purpose of identifying relationships between public
opinion and policy changes.

However, they do not

provide the information needed to compare the
specific knowledge of individuals to their preferences
and, in turn, to policy changes.

In order to deter

mine these relationships a pilot study was conducted
in Kalamazoo, Michigan, in May of 1965.

The results

of this original research and analysis are presented
in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV
PILOT STUDY OF PUBLIC OPINION
The results of national surveys reveal pref
erences and trends in attitudes, but the degree of
awareness which people nationwide have of policy
changes can only be estimated.

Therefore, a pilot

study was conducted to get a sample of elite opinion
which could be analyzed in detail.

The survey

involved interviews of opinion leaders and influen
tials in Kalamazoo, Michigan.1 In no way should the
survey be assumed to be equated with national surveys.
The questionnaire• was designed to determine the amount
of knowledge which selected people have of the ten
policy changes cited in Chapter Two and their pref
erences in respect to each aspect of foreign aid
involved.

The questionnaire was composed of three

sections: personal data, preferences, and knowledge of
policy changes.

The first section established per

sonal data in respect to age, education, occupation,
10pinion leaders are those who direct the
course of public opinion and to whom others turn for
k�owledge and interpretations of public affairs.
Influentials are people who informally affect the
attitudes of those with whom they come in contact.
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and level of income.

Also, specific questions were

asked to determine those people with a primarily local
orientation as opposed to those who are more cosmopol
itan.

These included points such as where people

travel, which newspapers and magazines they read reg
ularly, and the activities and organizations in which
respondents have participated on the local, state, and
national levels.

The second section of the question

naire was designed to determine the preferences of the
people interviewed in respect to those aspects of for
eign aid policy which have undergone change during the
last twenty years.

These points which asked for their

judgments were asked before those dealing with the
respondents' knowledge so as to gain a more accurate
measurement of information in each section than would
have been possible had questions of fact preceded
them.

The last group of questions, therefore, asked

specifically for the respondents' knowledge of each of
the ten selected changes in foreign aid policy.
The selection of respondents was based on cri
teria which would determine the opinion leaders and
influentials on the first, second, and third levels.
Twenty-six of the seventy-one persons interviewed were
top-level opinion leaders.

These twenty-six people

were identified in a survey conducted in 1963, specif-
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ically designed to determine the opinion leaders in
the City of Kalamazoo.2 An additional twenty-five
persons were named in the survey as second-level opin
ion leaders.

A third group of forty-three persons was

selected by the author for this survey by using the
positional approach.

This approach is regarded by

sociologists as the most reliable in determining opin
ion leaders and influentials on the basis of their
official capacities.3

Studies have revealed that

influentials are found to be concentrated in the legal
profession and in executive positions in business and
industry.4 Approximately 15 per cent of the respond
ents were attorneys and 22 per cent were executives.
According to other studies, the persons most sought
after locally for information and interpretation of
national and international affairs were more frequently
2Dr. Elton Ham, Professor of Political Science
at Kalamazoo College, conducted his study in such a
way as to determine the first and second-level opinion
leaders of Kalamazoo. The criteria used were the
active participation of certain people in two to four
specific local organizations which were deeply involved
in political issues at the time.
3People in prominent positions were selected
from the following areas: business, industry, profes
sional, social service, academic, religious, organiza
tional, official, and aesthetic.
4
Kenneth P. Adler and Davis Bobrow, 11 Interest
and Influence in Foreign Affairs�" The Public Opinion
Quarterly, Vol. XX (Spring, 1965;, No:" 1, p. 101.
. -.
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found in the liberal professions, such as law and
education.5 Nearly 30 per cent of the respondents in
this survey fall into this category.

Furthermore,

other studies indicate that more specialized individ
uals, usually on the second and lower levels, exercise
more direct influence on Jocal opinion toward foreign
policy matters than do most senior leaders.6 In the
opinion of the author, the people selected to be inter
viewed in this survey meet these criteria.

The proce

dure followed in conducting this survey began with a
letter sent to each of the prospective respondents
explaining the survey and asking for their cooperation.
Next, college students contacted the respondents to
arrange an appointment at which time they would fill
out the questionnaire.7

Out of the total of ninety

four people selected to be interviewed, seventy-one,
or 75.5 per cent, consented.
As a qualifying question, respondents were
asked whether or not they generally favored the policy
5Alfred O. Hero, Ooinion Leaders in American
Communities (New York: World Peace Founaation,
1959), p. 13.
6Ibid.,
p. 14.
7The respondents were interviewed by seventeen
students under the direction of Dr. Helenan S. Lewis
of the Center for Sociological Research, Western
Michigan University.
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of giving foreign aid.

Out of the sample interviewed,

73.2 per cent answered yes, 12.7 per cent, no, and
14.1 per cent, not sure or with qualifications.8

Those who did not favor foreign aid were not asked the
questions dealing with preferences since to have done
so would have distorted the results.

They were

requested to answer only the last section of the ques
tionnaire which dealt with their knowledge of policy
changes.

Approximately four out of five of those who

favored foreign aid believed that it should be in the
form of both economic and military assistance.

In

evaluation of foreign aid to date, 36.6 per cent of
all of the respondents felt that it has had good
results, whereas 32.4 per cent rated the results as
mediocre and 28.2 per cent felt the results have been
poor.

It is evident from the survey that those who

slightly favored the policy of giving foreign aid and
have reservations are the very people who felt that
the results have been poor.9

Over 70 per cent of the

respondents listed political and administrative short
comings as the greatest weaknesses of the foreign aid
8For the complete results of the survey in
percentages, see Appendix.
9This statement is based on a cross-tabulation
of answers to questions 17 and 28.

-
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program.

A considerable number of people praised the

Marshall Plan in thei� comments but added that they
did not believe foreign aid has had as much success
in the under�developed countries.

Some respondents

stated that aid to under-developed countries cannot
be adequately evaluated at this time and that its
degree of success could be fairly judged only after a
great number of years have passed
In order to determine the relationships between
the preferences and knowledge of the respondents in
respect to policy changes, the results of seventeen
questions have been paired off for comparison.10 When
asked what they believed the basic purpose of foreign
aid should be, 84.4 per cent answered, "to help under
developed coun�ries achieve political and social pro
gress and economic development," and 7.8 per cent,

11

to

show that a democracy is the best form of government."
However, when they were asked what the basic purpose
is now, only 54.9 per cent gave similar answers.

It

is evident that what most people prefer as the basic
purpose of foreign aid is exactly what it is according
lOThe seventeen questions which were paired
off for comparisons are the following: 18 and 34; 21
and 40; 22 and 39; 23 and 37; 24 and 38; 25 and 41;
26 and 42, 43; and 27 and 35 •

·•
t.'
.
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to official Washington.11

However, nearly half of

the respondents were not aware of the actual purpose
today.

In effect, people were endorsing a policy

objective which they did not know exists.

This can

be interpreted as either a lack of knowledge or con
siderable confusion or both.

A similar discrepancy

was apparent in another pair of answers.

Only 17.2

per cent thought the basic purpose should be to halt
the spread of Communism, but 36.6 per cent believed
that this actually is the purpose of foreign aid.
Since fostering economic development is also intended
to serve as a weapon against the spread of Communism
in the Cold War, it is not surprising that over one
third of the people interviewed believed that the main
purpose of foreign aid is to counteract Communist sub
version.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that many of the

people who placed the greatest value on the humanitar

ian task of helping under-developed countries did not
give the Government credit for having this purpose in
mind.

Apparently, many respondents preferred to think

that the Government is not as idealistic as they are
and, instead, has adopted the more practical objective
of combatting Communist subversion.
11supra,
pp. 28-30 •
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Another discrepancy is apparent in respect to
the proportions of economic aid and military aid.
While 81.8 per cent of the people interviewed felt
that there should be more economic aid than military
aid, only 40.8 per cent knew that economic aid is now
twice as great as military aid.12 In each question,
about 14 per cent of the people indicated that they
did not know.

Although only 1.8 per cent believed

there should be more military aid than economic aid,
25.4 per cent thought that now military aid is twice
as great as economic aid.

It is possible that many

people have confused some of the activities of the
Department of Defense, as in South Viet Nam, with the
foreign aid program.

The results indicate clearly a

lack of awareness of existing policies and objectives.
A lack of knowledge and understanding is also
evident in respect to the forms of aid, that is, grants,
loans, technical assistance, and material resources.
The results of two questions are compared in Table?.
In respect to the first question, people were obviously
more willing to give technical assistance than capital,
whether or not they recognized the need for capital in

the under-developed countries.
12supra,
pp. 43-44.

It is possible that

85

TABLE 7

22. "In your opinion, foreign aid should be given
primarily in the form of:
�7 %
60.9%
39.196
20. 396

A.

B.

c.

D.

grants
technical assistance
loans
material resources. II

39. "According to your knowledge, over half of all
economic aid is given now in the form of:
26. 81/b
4. 296
67.6%

A.

1.4%

D.

B.

c.

.

-.

!.'

I

loans
grants
grants and technical
assistance
don't know. 11
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some of these people did not understand what is nec

essary in order to bring about economic development.

It may also be that some people were aware that tech

nical assistance is less costly than other forms of aid
and would prefer that less money be spent for foreign
aid.

The answers to the second question indicate that

most people did not know that nearly two-thirds of eco
nomic aid now is in the form of loans.13
The results of two questions dealing with the
geographic distribution of foreign aid indicate
approval of policy which most of the people inter
viewed did not know exists.

This conclusion is based

on the percentages shown in Table 8.

While 71.9 per

cent of the respondents thought aid should be given

mostly to Asia, Africa, and Latin America, only 52.1
per cent knew that the current policy directs most of
aid to countries in Asia and Latin Arnerica.14 Appar
ently, this is another case of some people endorsing a
policy which they were not aware exists.

The surpris

ingly large percentages of respondents who believed
that aid is given mostly to countries in "Asia and
Europe" and also "Europe and Latin America" are evi-

13supra,

14Supra,

pp. 44-45.

PP• 33-37.
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TABLE 8

23. "According to your judgment, foreign aid should
be given now primarily to countries in:

3.1%
71.9%
10.9%
14.1%

A.
B.
C.
D.

Asia and Europe
Asia, Africa, and Latin America
Europe, Africa, and Latin America
don't know. 11

37. "It is your impression that now most of foreign
aid is directed to countries in:

23-296
22 .196

A.

2 - 7%

D.

18.3%

Asia and Europe
Asia and Latin America
Europe and Latin America
don't know. 11

B.

c.

i)
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dence that they did not know that European countries
have been receiving increasingly smaller amounts of
foreign aid each year since the early 1950 1 s.
Concentration of aid on a small number of care
fully selected countries has been a major part of for
eign aid policy since 1961. 15

Yet, respondents' pref

erences and knowledge indicate that they did not
realize this nor the reasons for this policy change.
The two questions asked received the answers shown in
Table 9.

Since over 8 5 per cent of the respondents

felt that aid should be given mostly to the poorest,
slowly progressing, loyal countries, it appears that
these people did not understand the development pro
cess.

They apparently were unai.-Tare that the poorest

countries cannot absorb large amounts of aid.

Further

more, they must not have realized the 5reat shortage of
trained manpower and capital investment in those coun
tries.

It is likely that these people were allowing

their humanitarian and Cold War instincts to over
shadow good judgment and realistic appraisals.

However,

approximately the same percentage of people were aware
that aid is concentrated on a small number of countries.
The closest relationship between preferences
1 5 Supra, pp. 37-42.
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TABLE 9

24.

11 As far as you are concerned, foreign aid should
be given mostly to:

15.6%

A.

46. 996

B.

40 .696

C.

the few countries (8 to 12)
which are able to absorb
large ar.,ounts and to advance
the most.
the countries which are slowly
progressing economically and
which are loyal to the United
States.
the very poorest nations which
need the greatest amount of
assistance."

38. "Your impression of the distribution of foreign
aid is that most of it is concentrated on:
00. 096

45.1%
42.7%
11.2%

A.
B.
C.

D.

two countries
ten countries
twenty-five countries
don't know."
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and knowledge is with respect to requirements made of
the recipient countries.

Of those interviewed, 76.6

per cent believed that recipient countries should be
required to formulate development plans and to under
take social and political reforms.

Similarly,

78.9

per cent of the respondents thought that countries
receiving U.S. aid at present are being required to
meet these conditions.

Since these requirements con
stitute one of the most striking policy changes,16 it

is particularly significant that people were appar
ently aware of its existence.
The benefits to the United States from giving
foreign aid are easily over-looked and often ignored
by critics.

Over half of the people interviewed,

53.1

per cent, believed that foreign aid should benefit not
only the recipient countries, but also the United
States as well by creating jobs, markets, profits, and
helping to dispose of surplus agricultural commodities.
In comparison, 43.8 per cent felt that only the recip
ient countries should benefit.

At the same time, 62

per cent of the respondents supported the policy of
tying 80 per cent of aid goods to American products.
Also, 67.6 per cent were aware that Public Law 480,
16Supra,

pp. 30-33.

�·
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the Food for Peace program, adds the benefit to the
domestic economy of helping to dispose of surplus
agricultural commodities.

In effect, more people

believed there are benefits to the United States from
giving foreign aid than people who believed there
should be domestic benefits.

Therefore, one can con

clude that many people were aware of the changes in
foreign aid policy which are intended to spur the
domestic economy.17
A final comparison can be made between people's
preferences and knowledge concerning the administration
of foreign aid.

Those who believed there should be one

central agency with sub-divisions amount to 68.8 per
cent of the people interviewed.

However, despite this

strong preference and persistent charges of misman

agement, only 50.7 per cent of the respondents recog

nized the Agency for International Development as the
administering agency.

In fact, one-quarter of the peo

ple interviewed indicated that they did not know the
name of the agency rather than guess at one of the
three choices given.

Clearly, although people have a

definite idea of the form of organization they prefer,
they did not know that such an agency already exists.

17Supra, pp. 52-57.
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As these comparisons have shown, the people
interviewed generally knew what policies they prefer;
but fewer knew what current policies actually are.
This is evident in the replies dealing with the pur
pose of foreign aid, the proportions of military and
economic aid, the geographic distribution, and the
administration of foreign aid.

This sample of public

opinion reveals that people endorse a policy which
they do not know already exists.

Furthermore, most of

the people in this survey apparently did not prefer
the current policy of giving primarily long-term loans.
Nearly two-thirds of the respondents felt that aid
should be mostly in the form of technical assistance.
The responses to questions on this matter clearly
indicate that most of the respondents have little
understanding of what is needed to bring about eco
nomic development_.

It may be that they simply dis

agree with the policy; but, if they do understand the
development process, they still choose to ignore the
fact that technical assistance as the main type of aid
is inadequate.

The lack of knowledge and understanding

demonstrated in the pilot study is especially signif
icant because the respondents are a select group.
results

The

ight have been expected of a cross-section of

the American public.

!.'

I

However, the respondents were
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selected because they were believed to represent the
In this sam

best informed segment of the community.

ple, therefore, it is evident that many opinion lead
ers and influentials are generally not aware of policy
changes and do not understand the ones which they do
know exist.
The next chapter presents conclusions based on
the entire thesis.

Each chapter has been aimed at

helping to determine the relationships between changes
in foreign aid policy and public opinion as measured
in national surveys and a pilot study.

The purpose

has been to indicate the i. pact of policy changes on
public opinion by proving whether or not people in
general are aware of policy changes, understand them,
and are prepared to fairly evaluate them.

CR! PTER V
SUJ\SL�RY Alrn cmrnLUSIONS

The thesis has been aimed at-determining the
relationships between ten selected changes in foreign
aid policy of the United States and public opinion
regarding these chane;es over the last ti:renty years.
The main purpose of tb.e study is to determine the
impact of policy chan5es on public opinion.

The

changes have been documented and studied in relation
to public opinion as measured in national surveys and
a pilot study.

The paper hypothesizes that Americans

generally are not aware of the substance of these
policy changes and that the U.S. public does not
really understand their significance and implications.
Consequently, most Americans are not prepared to evalu
ate foreign aid policy accuratelya
In Chapter One, the pri�ciples, assumptions,
and objectives of forei5n aid were exar;1ined and analyzed.
Two main principles underlie foreign aid policy:

giving

aid to other countries is vital to the national security
of the United States; and, assisting other nations in
relief, rehabilitation, and economic development is of
great moral value itself.

These rest, first, on the
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assumption that assiste.nce in the forms given can
Furthermore,

actually achieve the objectives laid do1tm.

they assume that economic, political, and social develop
ment in the world necessit�tes that the advanced nations
give assistance to under-developed countries for an
indefinite period of time.

Finally, they assume that

progress in those countries toward the goals which have
been set is largely dependent upon the a.mount of self
help involved in each instance.

The objectives of

forei5n aid have gradually evolved from providing
relief and rehabilitation for certain countries during
and following World \1"ar II to the prGsent objective of
helping under-developed countries achieve economic
viability and political and social prosress in freedom.
In retrospect, the principles, assumptions, and objec
tives of forei5n aid policy have developed and adapted
to meet changing needs and world conditions.
To serve as background for subsequent chapters,
Chapter One presented a resume of the historical
development of foreign aid progra�s from 1942 throu5h
1961, and the primary are;uments for and against the
policy of giving foreign assistance, opinions which
have persisted over the years.

The historical account

provided a framework against which the chane;es in
policy and public opinion could be seen.

Upon.examining
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divere;ent views of the American public toward foreign
aid., one can discern a certain degree of confusion as
evidenced, for example, by the arguments in respect to
the balance-of-payments situation and military security.
Those who believe that foreign aid. adds to the payments
deficit fail to understand the mathematical basis for
Lil:e1,.Jise, those who oppose foreign

such an assertion.

aid in favor of an isolationist policy and the neces
sary build-up of American military power apparently
fail to understand the intricscies and m2ssiveness of
preparing for and. carrying on direct warfare without
strong allies .

.. lso discernible is a very definite

lack of awareness on the part of many people.

Those

who would compare the work of the Marshall Plan with
the task which presently confronts the foreign aid
program clearly indicate that they are unmmre of the
inherent differences between acr�eiving economic rehabili
tation of war-torn Europe and the present goal of help
ing to achieve self-sustaining economic crm,rth in the
under-developed countries.

Those ·who advocate the

elimination of forei3n aid or drastic cutting of the
amount and giving only to allies reveal a misunder
standing, unawareness, or a disagreement with the pre
sumed consequences of such a policy, that is, the
security of the United Stata s, her world ime.e;e, and the

..
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and the future of freedom around the world which would
be at stake.

To give aid to only allies might lend

support to the accusation that the United States is
seeking to buy friendship.

Furthermore, people 1vho

view foreign aid in this way indicate that they are
obviously unaware of the basic purpose of aid at this
time which is to defend freedom, enhance the national
security of the United States, and also to help the
under-developed countries achieve economic viability.
These_ examples of public opinion as revealed in the
criticisms of foreign aid should serve to illustrate
clearly that the attitudes of nany -�e:c-icans are marked·
by confusion and a considerable lack of awareness.
Since the inception of foreign aid with the
Institute of Inter-unerican
been many changes in policy.
documented in Chapter Twoe

ffairs in 1942, there have
Ten selected changes were
One such chance concerned

the administration of foreign aid, a chanbe from a
haphazard arrangement covering several dep�rtments and
agenciss to a centralized institution, the A5ency for
International Development, created by Congress in 1961.
The gradual shift in objectives from limited economic
and political 5oals to long-ranse econo�ic development
and political goals constitutes a..Dother change.

A

third change is the shift in the 5eographic distribu-
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tion of aid from Europe to Asia and Latin America
since the late 1950 1 s, resulting in a major policy
departure.

Since countries in burope had almost com

pletely recovered from the devastating effects of
World War II by the mid-1950 1 s ? aid be3an to be directed
first toward countries in Asia and then, in the early
1960 1 s, to the countries of Latin America as well.

In

addition, there has been a fourth policy change which
has involved the concentration of the largest amounts
of aid on a few selected countries •

• t present, about

70 per cent of aid is given to the ten countries which
can absorb large amounts and advance most rapidly.

For

the first time since the riiarshall Plan, recipient
countries in this decade are required to formulate
development plans, ca1"ry out internal reforms, and exert
efforts of self-help5
change.

1nis constitutes a fifth policy

Another shift in policy involved a steady

increase in the proportion of economic aid as compared
with military aid since the late 1950 1 s.

Economic aid

is now more than twice as e;reat as military aid, in
contrast to economic aid being less than half of the
total appropriation each year as recently as 1959.

A

seventh change has been that of a proportional increase
of loans in relation to grants.

Loans now amount to

about 64 per cent of all economic aid as compared to
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aid being primarily in the form of grants during the
1940's and 1950's.

Long-term appropriations for devel

opment loans constitute the ei5hth policy change.

Prior

to 1961, all aid appropriations were �ade on a year-toyear basis.

t present, there are tw·o five-year appro-

priations for loans to under-developed countries.
Human resources, offered through the medium of the
Peace Corps, have now been added to money, goods, and
technical assistance and therefore constitute the most
dramatic chan5e from long-established policy.

The Peace

Corps helps to bridge the gap between technical experts
and the masses of unskilled workers in the under
developed countriese

The tenth policy chan5e is the

increasing emphasis put on deriving more benefits to
the domestic economy.

Public Lo.:w 480 helps dispose of

surplus agricultural commodites through the Food for
Peace program.

In addition, policy now requires that

over 80 per cent of aid goods be purchased from Ameri
can producers.

The United States now benefits from

more thar1 500,000 jobs and over t900 billion ·worth of
exports annually vrhich are created by the foreic;n aid
program.

Moreover, the Buy American policy contributes

to correcting the international balance-of-payments
deficit of the United States.
With these ten policy changes to serve as points
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of comparison, public opinion as measured in national
surveys was examined and analyzed in Chapter Three.
One prevailing attitude of Americana is that foreign
aid is a temporary policy.

Thie attitude may account

for much of the impatience of Americana toward foreign
aid.

Also, it may have some effect on there being

bitter debates in Congress each year on new foreign
aid bills.

In the early 1950's, approximately two

thirds of the people interviewed felt that the Marshall
Plan was a successful program and supported the policy.
However, 1n 1958, e.n AIFO poll revealed that only
50.8 per cent of respondents favored foreign aid and
32.7 per cent were against it.

About half of all the

people interviewed felt that the a.mount of aid is suffi
cient.

However, over one-third of the total believed

that too much is given.

This attitude, also, possibly

contributes to the dissatisfaction with foreign aid.
Apparently, critics either do not know or do not care
that the amount appropriated has decreased steadily from
over $8 billion in FY 1951 to $3.4 billion in FY 1964.
The change in objectives to giving aid to
under-developed countries to help them achieve long
range economic development and self-sustaining gro�th
is paralleled by a steady increase in public support
of such a policy.

The surveys made from 1949 to 1955,
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show that support has grown from 72 per cent to 79
per cent of those interviewed.

This trend !ndicates

the further decline of isolationist sentiment in the
United States and a general willingness to have the
United states play a major role in the economic develop
ment of nearly half the globe.

This public support

may have encouraged the Kennedy Administration and
Congress to change the objectives, distribution, form,
and requirements of foreign aid.

Another point of

comparison is with respect to long-term appropriations
for development loans.

In 1956, only 25 per cent of

those interviewed felt that it would be a good policy.
By 1957, 39 per cent voiced support of long-term
appropriations.

Even though the action lacked consider

able public support, Congress, in 1961, passed a five

year appropriation for development loans, approved the
same policy for loans under the Alliance for Progress

in 1962, and committed itself to contributing $20 billion
to Latin America during the decade of the 1960's.
Furthermore, people interviewed in 1954 and 1955, were
asked if aid should be given only to allies or to
neutrals as well.

In both years just under half of the

respondents felt that aid should be given to neutrals
while nearly half believed that it should not.

current

policy reveals that neutrals do in fact receive United
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States aid.

India, a strong, neutralist nation,

receives the largest amount of aid given.
Evidence provided by survey results indicates
a strong preference in American opinion for economic
aid over military aid.

Nearly three�quarters of

respondents over the five-year period- from 1951 to

1956, felt that economic is more important.

It is

significant that throughout most of the 1950 1 s, when
foreign aid had a military orientation, people expressed
a preference for economic aid.

However, it was not

until the late l950's, that the proportion of economic
aid increased substantially.

Since 1961, there has

been a more dramatic chan5e in emphasis which has
resulted in economic aid amounting to twice as much
as military aid as of FY 1964.

This policy change is

attributable to the change in purpose of foreign aid
and also the subversive tactics of the Communist World

in waging the Cold War.

Also, public sentiment in

favor of a greater proportion of economic aid existed
long before the policy change occurred.
In respect to the geographic distribution of

foreign aid, in 1953, only 41.6 per cent of the people
interviewed expressed approval of giving less aid to
Europe and more to Asia.

The rest of the respondents

may have failed to realize that Europe had almost
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recovered economically from World War II.

Aid to

European countries has gradually been phased out s1nce
1952.

Only two countries in Europe are being given

aid in FY 1965.

At the present time, Europe not only

does not need aid, but some countries now have· foreign
aid programs ot their own.

If the survey results are

not an indication of lack of awareness in total, it
may be that they also indicate that many people simply
do not favor giving aid to countries of Asia.
The final relationship between a policy change
and public opinion was in respect to the administration
of foreign aid.

As indicated in the results of surveys

made in.the 1950's, approximately one-third of the
respondents listed poor administration, mismanagement,
and mishandling of money and goods as the major weak
nesses of the foreign aid program.

Many people still

make these criticisms of foreign aid despite the fact
that one of the major policy changes has been the
creation of the Agency for International Development
in 1961.

Some criticisms of the administration of

foreign aid since 1961 may lack adequate justification.
Perhaps public dissatisfaction with the administration
of programs prior to the creation of AID had some
influence in bringing about the change, but survey
results tend to show that many people have failed to
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realize that administrative reorganization and central
ization have taken place.

Several broad conclusions can be drawn on the
basis of analyses of national survey results when
related to policy changes.

Statistics show that in

several instances the majority of public opinion runs
parallel to certain changes in foreign aid policy.
However, no causal relationship has been established.
Most of the relationships documented in Chapter Three
tend .to indicate that most people do not know that
certain policy changes have been instituted.

Further

more, analyses of these relationships indicate that
even when they are aware of the changes they are not
necessarily aware of their significance and implica
tions.

This evidence supports the assumptions in

the hypothesis.

The author has found no conclusive

evidence that trends in public opinion have been key
factors in·the initiation or .formulation of foreign
aid policy.

Thie lack of influence and the dtscrep

ancies between majority opinion and policy changes
can be explained in at least two different ways.
Perhaps people simply are not informed of policy changes,
do not understand them when they are aware, or have
little interest in the subject.

Or, it could be that

people in general hold to their preconceived notions
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with or without being informed of the facts involved
and have little concern for the substance of current
policy.
Chapter Four presents and analyzes the pilot
study of opinion leaders and influentials in Kalamazoo,
Michigan.

It was undertaken to determine the amount

of knowledge that those people have of changes in
foreign aid policy 1n relation to their preferences.
This study was made because the results of national
surveys show only preferences and trends in attitudes.
The degree to which people are informed of policy
changes can only be estimated.

Therefore, the sample

survey was designed to determine specifically the
relationships between preferences and knowledge of
policy changes of the people who should·be well-informed
because of their status in civic activities and influ
ence on public opinion.
The analysis of the survey results shows,
first, that nearly three-quarters of the respondents
favored the policy of giving foreign aid.

Approxi

mately four out of five of those who favored foreign
aid believed that it should be in the form of both
economic and military assistance.

Replies to nine

pairs of questions were compared.

Whereas 84.4 per

cent of the respondents believed the purpose of foreign
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aid should be to help under-developed countries achieve
economic viability and progress in freedom, only 54.9

per cent indicated that they knew this actually is the

basic purpose.

A similar discrepancy was evident in

respect to their preference and knowledge of economic
aid being considerably greater.than military aid.
These results tend to show that most people endorse
policies which they do not know exist.

While current

policy has resulted in about two-thirds of economic
aid being given in the form of loans, 60.9 per cent

of the respondents preferred teohn1cal aea1atanoe,

and 67.6 per cent believed that aid is given primarily
in the form of grants and technical assistance.

This

1s evidence of a lack of knowledge concerning the
present policy and disagreement with it as well.

A further indication of laek of knowledge was

to be found in the results of questions dealing with
Ne,arly
three-quarters of the people interviewed thought that
the geographic distribution of foreign aid.

aid should be given primarily to countries in Asia and
Latin America.

However, only half of the respondents

knew that this policy exists.

About 40 per cent

thought that European countries still receive large
amounts of aid.

Clearly, many of the people inter

viewed did not know the geographic direction of aid
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today or that El.rope is no longer 1n need of American
economic or military aid.

Nevertheless, the preferences

of the people interviewed showed an endorsement of the
policy even though many of them did not know it exists.
Statistics showed that less than hal-f of the people
interviewed preferred that aid be concentrated on the
few countries which can absorb the greatest amounts
and advance most rapidly.

Less than half of the res

pondents indicated that they knew this is the current
policy.

Although many people indicated that they

think the largest amounts of aid should be given to
the poorest, slowly progressing, anti-Communist countries,
they probably do not realize the full implications of
such a policy.

The survey tended to indicate that

people are not only unaware of the present policy of
concentrating aid on specific countries, but that they
apparently do not understand the reasons for such a
policy.
The closest relationship between preferences
and knowledge was apparent from the results of questions
in the pilot study on requirements made of recipients.
More than three-quarters of the respondents favored
such a policy and also indicated that they knew it is
in effect.

These results are evidence that people

have awareness and understanding of at least one aspect
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of foreign aid policy.

Statistics showed that more

people are becoming increasingly aware of the benefits to the economy of the United States from giving
foreign aid.

Over half of the respondents felt that

the United States as well as the recipient countries
should benefit from the aid program.

More than two

thirds of the people interviewed supported the policies
of selling surplus agricultural products and tying over
80 per cent of aid goods to American products.

The final

relationship dealt with views on the administration of
foreign aid.

Although /llOre than two-thirds of tl1e respon

dents believed there should be one central agency in

charge, only 50.7 per cent knew the name of. the admi
nistering agency which was created four years ago.

One

quarter of the people interviewed indicated that they
have no idea what the agency is called.

Such evidence

leads to the·conclusion that there is a substantial lack
of awareness-of this change in policy.
The conclusions of this study coincide with some
of t11e findings of a public information cam:raiE:71- on the
United Nations, conducted in Cincinnati, Ohio.

The

results of a poll following that campaign conformed
roughly to the national pattern as established by simi
lar polls which followed public information campaigns.
According to those national surveys:
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About 30per cent of the electorate, on
the average, is unaware of almost any given
event in American foreign affairs.
About 45 per cent of the electorate is
aware of important events in the field but
cannot be considered informed. These people
retain little information. Although they
may follow discussions of the issues of
forei3I). policy, they cannot frame intelli
gent arguments about them.
Only 25 per cent of the electorate consistently shows knowledge of foreign problems.1
The Cincinnati poll results showed that after a six
month information campaign,the informed people had become
better informed.

However, a large proportion of the

people remained unaware, and more than half of the rest
were found to be uninformed.

The primary conclusion was

that the approximately 75 per cent who remain ignorant
feel no personal interest in subjects related to the

country's foreign policy.2 Based on the results of those

surveys, it is probable that a public information cam
paign on foreign aid conducted in Kalamazoo would have
similar results.

People generally are not concerned

about foreign aid policy because the impact, even wten
significant, is not recognizable to them on a personal
basis.

The average citizen does not have adequate

lMarshall Knappen, An Introduction to American
Forei�n Policy, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956),
p. 20.
2 Ibid., p. 205.
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knowledge of international economics to understand why
foreign aid is needed and how it is actually helping
nations to achieve economic viability.

The role of

forei3n aid in the Cold War context is also not apparent
to most citizens.

Legitimate aspirations of under

developed nations are ignored or rejected by a large
segment of the American public.
The lack of knowledge and understanding of foreign
aid policy on the part of many Americans may be attri
butable to many factors.

Most people do not have the

interest, time, comprehension, or background to become
well-informed or articulate on the subject.

Moreover,

the means of mass communication lack the content and
depth necessary to adequately inform the public.

How

ever, as indicated in the Cincinnati study and national
surveys, approximately three-quarters of the adults in
the United States remain i3norant or uninformed even after
a public information campaign.

People tend to become

emotional about sensational news items.

Mostly, the

public appears to be indifferent or apathetic.

In a

democracy people are free to choose whether or not they
will become informed on matters vital to the nation.
Although the political process is desi511ed to afford
many points of access for citizens who wish to exert
influence on decision-makers, evidence indicates that
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moat people are not sufficiently interested in foreign
aid policy to become informed or to understand and
evaluate fairly policy changes.
How can this lack of awareness and public disinterest
be explained?

In the author's view, they rest primarily

on a shortcoming of human nature.
have to do is left to choice.

What people do not

What people are not

involved in holds little interest.

What does not interest

people receives little or no attention.

Therefore,

because the impact of foreign aid is removed from the
lives of nearly all Americans, people generally are not
concerned about the subject and consequently do not
become informed.

This view of human nature helps to

explain much of the evidence presented in this paper.
In conclusion, the evidence presented in tl:is paper
shows that there has been little or no relationship
between changes in foreie;n aid policy and public opinion.
Public opinion has had little or no impact upon the
changes in foreign aid policy since the public, both
general and elite, has usually been unaware, uninformed
or misinformed about such policy.

Conversely, foreign

aid policy changes have had little or no impact uron pub
lic opinion since the national polls and the pilot study
indicate that the public has remained largely unaware,
uninformed or misinformed about the changes after they
have been implemented.

APPENDIX

SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION ON FOREIGN AID
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- l 1.

Age:

11.2%

20 - 29 years

2.:z.4�

40 - 49 years

18.2�

29.6�

12.2%
1.4%

30 - 39 years

50 - 59 years

60 - 69 years
70 - 79 years

2.

Sex:

3.

Marital Status:

4.

Number of years of education:

z1.a% Male

29.6 % Female
82.1% Married
2.8% Other

14.1% Single

16.9�

13 years

22.2%

over 17 years

22•2%

5.

High School Diploma:

6.

College Degree:

,2.696 No

26.8� No

17 J7ears

94.4% Yes

72.2% Yes

-------------------

7. Occupation

26.1%

Professional and Managerial

�

Other White Collar

4.2%

Skilled and Semi-skilled

00.0%

oo.o�
11.2�

Unskilled
Farmer
Homemaker
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2.8%
8.

9.

Approximate annual income:
2.8%

less than $3,000

16.2%

$6,000 to $9,000

42-2%

over $12,000

11.2%

$3,000 to $6,000

11.2�

$9,000 to $12,000

What newspapers do you read regularly?

22- 8%

Kalamazoo Gazette

�

National Observer

47-2%

40.8�
22.2%

�

4.2%

22.4%
10.

Detroit Free Press
Wall Street Journal
Chicago Tribune
Detroit News

Chicago Sun-Times
New York Times

To what magazines do you subscribe?
70.4%
66.2%
18.2%

�

11.

Retired

Social

Please list.

News
Professional
Business

Do you belong to organizations which concern them-
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- 3 selves with matters on the:

81.7% local level
76.1% state level
67.6% national level

Please list the names below:
12.

Do you participate in organizations which concern
themselves with matters on the:

81.7% local level
63.4% state level
38.0% national level

Could you briefly describe the capacity in which
you participate? For example: attendance at
meetings, committee membership, holding an elec
tive or appointive office.
13.

Have you �ver served on a Governor's or Pres
ident's advisory committee or testified before a
state legislative or congressional committee?
67.6% No 23.9% Yes

If yes, which committee, when, and what was the
subject?

14. Which area of news is of the greatest interest to
you?

63.4%
50.7%
56.3%
50.?%

Local
State
National
International
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15 .

Do you travel occasionally outside of Kalamazoo?

2.8%

No

97.2%

Yes

If yes, where do you generally go?
16.

Who are your favorite TV and radio news commen
tators?

17.

In general, do you favor the policy of giving
foreign aid, military or economic or both?
12.7%

72- 2%

14.1%

No
Yes
Not sure, or with qualifications

If "no, II turn to question 28.
18.

As you regard foreign aid, the basic purpose
should be to:
�

19 ..

17.2%

halt the spread of Communism in the
world.

84.4%

help under-developed countries achieve
political and social progress and
economic development.

Do you feel that military aid should be eliminated?

79-7%

20 ..

show that a democracy is the best form
of ,government.

No

�

Yes

14.0%

Don't Know

Do you feel that economic aid should be eliminated?

8:z.9� No

1.6%

Yes

12.!z%

Don't Know
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(Ask this question only of those who answered
"No" to questions !2, and20.)

What do you believe would be the best proportions
of foreign aid?

22.

�

equal amounts for military aid and
economic aid

1.8%

more military aid than economic aid

81.8%

more economic aid than military aid

14.6%

don't know

In your opinion, foreign aid should be given pri
marily in the form of:
�

60 .2 %
29-1%
20.2%

23.

technical. assistance
loans
material resources

According to your judgment, foreign aid should be
given now primarily to countries in:
Asia and Europe

2-1%

71.9%

10.9%

Asia, Africa, and Latin America
Europe, Africa, and Latin America

14.1%

24.

grants

Don't Know

As far as you are concerned, foreign aid should
be given mostly to:
15.6%

the few countries (8 to 12) which are
able to absorb large amounts and to
advance the most.
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25.

46.9%

the countries which are slowly pro
gressing economically and which are
loyal to the United States.

40.6%

the v.ery poorest nations which need the
greatest amount of assistance.

00.0%

Don't Know

In your opinion, countries receiving United
States aid should:
10.9%

provide equal amounts of money and
materials.
be required to vote with the United
States in the United Nations.

76.6%

14.1%
00.0%

26.

be required to formulate development
plans and to undertake social and
political reforms.
not be required to make commitments of
any kind in order to receive aid.
Don't Know

According to your views, foreign aid should
benefit:
43.8%

53.1%

only the recipient countries by con
tributing to their economic development,
helping them plan and carry out social
and political reforms, and assisting
them to become self-sufficient, inde
pendent countries.
the recipient countries and also our
domestic economy by creating more jobs
in the production of goods, helping to
dispose of surplus agricultural commod
ities, and building new world markets
for U.S. products.
Don't Know
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As you view bureaucratic procedure, the admin
istration of foreign aid should be handled by:
18.8%

68.8z6

separate regional agencies, such as one
each for Africa, Latin America, and the
other areas.
several agencies, each of which would
be responsible for a specific type of
aid such as grants, technical assist
ance, etc.
one central agency with sub-divisions.
don't know.

28.

How would you evaluate foreign aid as to the
degree of success?
28.2%

poor

32.496

mediocre

,36.6%

good

2.2%
29.

30.

What would you say is the most undesirable aspect
or weakest point of foreign aid?
76.1%

administrative

71.8%

political

16.9%

economic

What changes, if any, do you think should be made
in our foreign aid policy?
00.0%

31.

cannot state

don't know

As far as you can recall, foreign aid has been
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given since about:

2,2.2�
64.8%
00.096

00.0%
32.

1961

don't know

11.2%

United Nations Relief and Rehabilita
tion Administration

60. 6%

Marshall Plan
Aid to Greece and Turkey

�

Mutual Security Program

7.0 %

Don't Know

It is your understanding that the purpose of the
Marshall Plan was to help:
95.8%

Western Europe rebuild economically
after World War II.

1.4%

the Allies militarily and economically
during World War II.

1.4%

countries recover from the Depression.

1.4%

don't know.

00.0%

34.

1945

To your knowledge the first major foreign aid
program was the:

l,2.,2%

33.

1930

the members of the United Nations.

It is your impression that now the basic purpose
of foreign aid is to:
54.9%

show that ours is the best form of gov-
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- 9 ernment and that it is concerned with
worldwide economic development and
humanitarian work.

8.5% provide more government jobs for our

citizens and give additional respon
sibilities to the D_epartment of State.

36.6% counteract Communist subversion and

totalitarianism around the world and
strengthen our national security.

00.0%

35.

don't know.

The agency now responsible for administering the
total foreign economic aid program is the:
14.1%

Mutual Security Agency

�

International Cooperation Administra
tion

50.7%

Agency for International Development

25.3% Don't Know

36.

To your knowledge, the annual cost of foreign
aid has:

53.5% increased
26.8% decreased
00.0%

15.5%

4.2%

37.

remained the same

fluctuated but stayed at relatively the
same amount
don't know

It is your impression that now most of foreign aid
is directed to countries in:
23.9%

Asia and Europe
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52.1% Asia and Latin America
18.3% Europe and Latin America
�

38.

Don't Know

Your impression of the distribution of foreign
aid is that most of it is concentrated on:
00.0%

two countries

11.2%

don't know

45.1% ten countries
43.7% twenty-five countries
39.

According to your knowledge, over half of all
economic aid is given now in the form of:
26.8%

loans

67.6%

grants and technical assistance

4.2% grants
1.4%

40.

41.

don't know

Your impression is that now:
19.7%

the amounts for military aid and eco
nomic aid are about equal.

25.4%

military aid is more than twice as
great as economic aid.

40.8%

economic aid is more than twice as
great as military aid.

14.1%

don't know.

To your knowledge, countries receiving U.S. aid
are now required to:
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28 -9% undertake internal reforms and to for
mulate development plans (economic,
political, and social).

provide matching funds and personnel
for every project.
support the United States in inter
national affairs and vote with us in
the United Nations.
reject Communism and the Communist
countries.
don't know.
42.

At present 80 per cent of the goods paid for by
foreign aid must be bought from producers in the
United States. What is your opinion of this
policy?
62.0%

Support.

11.3% Believe that all of the goods bought
should be American products.

�
12.7%
4.1%
43.

Believe that buying mostly American
products is not necessary.

Believe that recipient countries should
purchase goods from any country in
which they are most economical.
Don't· Know.

The Food for Peace program which involves selling
surplus agricultural products to underdeveloped
nations adds to foreign aid:
23-9%

the expense of buying foodstuffs on the
American market and shipping them
abroad.

67.6% the benefit to our domestic economy

of helping to dispose of surplus com-
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modities.
�
44.

don't know.

What effect do you believe our foreign aid
expenditures have on our balance-of-payments?
They help maintain a favorable balance
of-payments.
26.8%

46.5%
�

They have little effect on our balance
of-payments.
They help correct an unfavorable bal
ance-of-payments.
They add to the deficit.
Don't Know.
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